The Impact of Treaties on Australian Federalism by Opeskin, Brian R. & Rothwell, Donald R.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 27 | Issue 1
1995
The Impact of Treaties on Australian Federalism
Brian R. Opeskin
Donald R. Rothwell
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Brian R. Opeskin and Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact of Treaties on Australian Federalism, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 1 (1995)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/7
THE IMPACT OF TREATIES ON AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM
Brian R. Opeskin*
Donald R. Rothwelt*
I. INTRODUCTION
A well-known commentator on federal government, Sir Kenneth
Wheare, once observed that "[flederalism and a spirited foreign policy go
ill together."1 Whether or not one agrees with Wheare's conclusion, there
is little doubt that his aphorism highlights a complexity faced by federal
States in the conduct of their foreign relations, which is not shared by
unitary States.2 In federal States, both the decision to incur international
treaty obligations and the implementation of those obligations in domestic
law may need to accommodate the interests and competencies of national
governments, as well as those of the constituent states of the federation.
Thus, it has been remarked that "[d]ivided legislative competence is a
feature of federal government that has, from the inception of modem
federal [S]tates, been a well recognized difficulty affecting the conduct of
their external affairs."3 As a federal State, Australia shares many of the
problems of other federations in pursuing a robust foreign policy.4 In this
. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University .of Sydney. Parts Il-IV of this article
are based on a report on Constitutional Law and International Law, prepared for the
14th International Congress of Comparative Law, Athens, 1994.
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney.
K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 196 (3rd ed. 1953).
In this Article "State" refers to the geopolitical entity that is the subject of
international law, while "state" refers to a constituent unit of a federation. All refer-
ences to "Acts" are references to those of the Australian parliament unless another
jurisdiction is indicated.
' New South Wales v. Commonwealth [hereinafter The Seas and Submerged Lands
Case], 135 C.L.R. 337, 445 (Stephen, J.) (1975).
' Australia comprises six states, two internal territories, and numerous external
territories. The six states (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania,
Victoria and Western Australia) were formerly British colonies, which federated in 1901
to become the Commonwealth of Australia. The two internal territories (the Northern
Territory and the Australian Capital Territory) were formed at a later date from land
surrendered by the states and accepted by the Commonwealth. Both territories have now
been granted self-governing status. See Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act,
AUSTL. C. ACmS No. 58 (1978); Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act,
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article we examine these difficulties, and the solutions that have been
found to some of them, in the context of the Australian federal system.
In Australia, two factors underlie the importance of examining the
dynamic of federal-state relations in respect of international affairs. The
first arises from the constitutional division of power between state and
federal governments. Curiously, the Australian Constitution is silent on
many aspects of the internal allocation of power and responsibility for the
conduct of the country's foreign relations.5 The Constitution does not
mention whether the federal executive power extends to the making of
treaties, nor whether that power is exclusive of the states. Similarly, the
Constitution does not expressly confer legislative power on the federal
Parliament to implement treaties or customary international law.6 Rather,
federal Parliament is granted power to make laws with respect to "exter-
nal affairs,"7 and the ambit of this power has been a fertile source of
dispute between state and federal governments over the last decade.
The second factor arises not from legal constraints imposed by the
Constitution, but from the functional division of power between state and
federal governments, reflecting political rather than legal concerns. Since
the late 1970s, Australia's federal (Commonwealth) government has
generally approached its relationship with the states in a spirit of co-
operative federalism. The key aspects of this approach have been the
federal government's self-imposed restraint in exercising its constitutional
powers, and its willingness to involve the organs of state government in
matters that touch or affect traditional state interests. In the field of
international relations, cooperative federalism has resulted in the involve-
ment of state governments in the processes of treaty negotiation and
treaty implementation.
In light of these issues, this Article examines the manner in which
AUSTL. C. Acrs No. 6 (1988). Although important constitutional differences remain, for
most practical purposes the position of the internal territories has been assimilated to
that of the states.
' The Australian Constitution was drafted at a number of constitutional conferences
in the 1890s, when international law was in its infancy. The Constitution makes only
one reference to treaties, namely, when conferring judicial power on the High Court "in
all matters arising under any treaty." AusTL. CONST. ch. I, § 75 (i).
6 Like the U.S. Constitution, the Australian Constitution grants power to the federal
legislature only over a defined class of matters, which are principally found in the 39
placita of § 51. AusTL. CONST. ch. I. By virtue of § 107, and subject to the Constitu-
tion, each state maintains the plenary legislative power that it enjoyed as a colony prior
to federation. AusTL. CONST. ch. V, § 107. However, to the extent that state law is
inconsistent with federal law, federal law prevails. AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 109.
7 AusTL. CONST. ch. I, § 51 (xxix).
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the implementation of international treaties in Australia has been affected
by the dynamics of federal-state relations.' Parts II, III and IV provide
the legal and institutional framework in which-these federal issues may be
considered by presenting an overview of the role of the federal govern-
ment, the state governments and the courts in making, implementing and
interpreting treaties in Australia. Given that responsibility for international
relations may potentially be shared between the state and federal spheres,
and between the three principal arms of government within each sphere
(the executive, the legislature and the judicature), the picture is indeed a
complex one. However, it is not intended to do more here than provide
a conspectus of these issues.
Parts V and VI then present two case studies, which examine in
detail the way in which federal-state relations have affected the imple-
mentation of treaties in Australia. The first study concerns the World
Heritage listing of large wilderness areas in the states of Tasmania and
Queensland, pursuant to the World Heritage Convention.9 Recommenda-
tions by the federal government for the listing of state land as World
Heritage property have generated sharp conflict between federal and state
governments because of the restrictions on land usage that such conserva-
tion measures necessarily entail. The second case study concerns the
conflict between the Commonwealth and the state of Tasmania over
certain provisions of Tasmania's Criminal Code, which have placed
Australia in breach of its obligations under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR).0 In March, 1994 the
Human Rights Committee ruled that Australia was in breach of the
privacy provision of the ICCPRu as a result of Tasmanian laws that
prohibit sexual relations between consenting adult males in private.
Tasmania's repeated refusal to repeal the offending laws has posed
considerable difficulties for the federal government in honouring
Australia's international treaty obligations. Finally, Part VII offers some
" This Article is confined to the role of treaties in Australian law. For a discussion
of the relationship between customary international law and Australian law, see James
Crawford & W.R. Edeson, International Law and Australian Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN AUSTRALIA 71 (K.W. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 1984); Gillian Triggs, Customary
International Law and Australian Law, in THE EMERGENCE OF AUSTRALIAN LAW 376
(M.P. Ellinghaus et al. eds., 1989). For analogous discussion of the English position,
see J.G. Collier, Is International Law Really Part of the Law of England?, 38 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 924 (1989).
' Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37; 1975 Austl. T.S. No. 47.
10 Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 1980 Austl. T.S. No. 23.
" Art. 17 protects an individual, inter alia, from arbitrary or unlawful interference
with privacy, family, home or correspondence. ICCPR supra note 10, at 177.
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brief conclusions on the impact of federalism on the implementation of
international treaties in Australia.
II. THE ROLE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. Federal Executive
Section 61 of the Australian Constitution vests the executive power
of the Commonwealth in the Queen of Australia, and provides that the
power is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representa-
tive.'2 This power is expressed to extend "to the execution and mainte-
nance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth," but
nowhere does the Constitution enumerate the powers of the federal
executive or make specific mention of the executive's authority to enter
into treaties or conduct foreign relations.
In view of Australia's colonial history, this silence is unsurprising.
Prior to federation in 1901, the U.K. had the power to conduct foreign
relations and conclude treaties on behalf of the various Australian colo-
nies, as part of the British Empire. After federation it was thought that
the Imperial government should continue to conduct the foreign policy of
the Empire. Only gradually did Australia develop an independent interna-
tional personality.'3 As indicia of its gradual international awakening,
Australia was an original signatory to the Covenant of the League of
Nations in 1919;' 4 created its first separate department of External Af-
fairs in 1935; established its first diplomatic representation outside Lon-
don in 1940;' and took special care when declaring war on Japan in
1941 to adopt a procedure consonant with its full status over its external
12 GEORGE WINTERTON, PARLIAMENT, THE ExEcUTIvE, AND THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL 23 (1983).
"3 See D.P. O'Connell, The Evolution of Australia's International Personality, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA I (D.P. O'Connell ed., 1965); Malcolm M. Lewis,
The International Status of the British Self-Governing Dominions, 3 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 21 (1922-23); Leslie Zines, The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effect on
the Powers of the Commonwealth, in COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITU-
TION: A TRIBUTE TO GEOFFREY SAWER 1 (Leslie Zines ed., 1977). Justice Murphy, a
vocal opponent of this view, claimed that federation in 1901 brought about a funda-
mental legal and political change in which the Commonwealth emerged as a new
political entity with the status of a nation. China Ocean Shipping Co. v. South
Australia, 145 C.L.R. 172, 236-39 (1979).
,4 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (Supp. Apr. 28, 1919). The Covenant constituted Part I
of the Treaty of Versailles.
"5 John Ravenhill, Australia, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL UNITS 76, 116 n.3 (Hans J. Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos
eds., 1990).
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relationships.'6
Since Australia's coming of age in the international community, there
is no doubt that the federal executive possesses full capacity to conduct
Australia's relations with foreign countries. This power includes making,
terminating and performing treaties; declaring peace and war; annexing
and ceding territory; seizing land or goods as conquest; appointing
ambassadors and so on. As one High Court judge stated in relation to the
making of treaties, "the federal executive, through the Crown's representa-
tive, possesses exclusive and unfettered treatymaking power."'7 More-
over, executive action in relation to the making of treaties is free from
formal legislative control or scrutiny. In the words of the current Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, "[t]he Constitutional
power to enter into treaties is one that belongs to the Governor General
in Council. The Commonwealth Parliament, in consequence, has no
formal function to exercise by way of review or oversight of international
Conventions, treaties and agreements which the Federal Government is
considering signing.""
Notwithstanding that the power of the federal executive to enter into
treaties is unfettered, the current practice of the Australian government
carves out an important role for federal and state legislatures. After the
text of a treaty has been settled, it is necessary to obtain the approval of
the Federal Executive Council before any treaty action is taken, whether
by way of signature, ratification or other step subsequent to signature.'9
As a matter of policy, this approval will not be given unless all necessary
steps have been taken to bring Australian law into conformity with the
treaty obligations by the time the treaty enters into force for Australia."
6 O'Connell, supra note 13, at 20. A different view had been taken of the
declaration of war on Germany in 1939, when it was apparently assumed that the
U.K.'s declaration of war compelled the same response by Australia. See 161 PARL.
DEB., H. R., 28-29 (Sept. 6, 1939).
'" Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168, 215 (Stephen, J.) (1982). See also
Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 158 C.L.R. 1, 298-99 (Dawson, J.) (1983).
18 133 PARL. DEB., S., 2525 (May 23, 1989), reprinted in 12 AUsTL. Y.B. INT'L
L. 467 (1992).
,' The Federal Executive Council is established by the Constitution to advise the
Governor-General (in whom the executive power is reposed), and comprises federal
ministers of State. AusTL. CONST. ch. II, §§ 61-64. Executive Council approval is not
required for the signature of arrangements of less than treaty status. Such arrangements
have moral and political force, but are not legally binding.
20 DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, THE CONCLUSION OF TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 16-17 (1987). See also the answers
submitted by the Australian Government to questions asked by the European Committee
on Legal Cooperation in a survey of State practice on treaty-making, 11 AusTL. Y.B.
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Indeed it has only been on rare occasions, such as with the ratification of
the World Heritage Convention, that Australia has ratified an international
convention in advance of the necessary implementing legislation.2 The
reason for this practice is that, where legislation is necessary to give
effect to the provisions of a treaty, the executive cannot know whether
the relevant legislature will pass that legislation.' If Australia were to
become party to a treaty on the assumption that the implementing legisla-
tion would be passed, but it was not passed, Australia might be placed in
breach of the treaty. Such a situation would embarrass Australia in its
conduct of foreign affairs, especially if there were no provision for
withdrawal from the treaty. As a result, the federal executive will gener-
ally not risk breaching its international obligations by taking hasty treaty
action, notwithstanding its clear power to do so.
B. Federal Legislature
In contrast to the position in some countries, Australia's international
treaty obligations do not automatically have the force of law within the
municipal legal system. As the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
has stated the matter:
Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the
INT'L L. 500 (1991).
21 Australia ratified the World Heritage Convention on Aug. 22, 1974, nearly a
decade before the enactment of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, No.
5 (1983). See Part V infra. A more recent example is the Convention Concerning
Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer 1982 (ILO Convention)
No. 158, June 22, 1982, which was ratified by Australia on Feb. 26, 1993, before the
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 implemented the treaty obligations. See Breen
Creighton, Industrial Regulation and Australia's International Obligations, in A NEW
PROVINCE FOR LEGALISM: LEGAL IssuES AND THE DEREGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
LATIONS 101, 110 (Paul Ronfeldt & Ron McCallum eds., 1993).
' Bill Campbell, Domestic Implementation of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND AUSTRALIAN DOMESTIC LAW 15 (Henry Burmester & Rosalie Balkin eds.,
1994); Michael Kirby, The Australian Use of International Human Rights Norms: From
Bangalore to Balliol - A View from the Antipodes, 16 U. N.S.W. L.J. 363, 369 (1993).
In the case of federal implementation, it is necessary for a Bill to pass both the House
of Representatives and the Senate. Because the federal executive is formed from the
ranks of parliamentarians who belong to the political party or parties that command a
majority in the House, the executive can generally be assured of passage of the
legislation through the House. However, the Senate is frequently controlled by an
opposition party or coalition of parties, which may obstruct passage of the Bill. In the
case of state implementation, the difficulties may be greater still because opposition
parties might control both Houses of the state legislature.
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making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its
obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires
legislative action. Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a
treaty duly ratified do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty
alone, have the force of law.'
The rationale for this approach lies in the doctrine of the separation
of legislative and executive power. If the executive were able to alter the
law of the land merely by entering into a treaty with another country, the
authority of the legislature, which is vested with responsibility for making
laws for the "peace, order, and good government of the Common-
wealth," 4 would be usurped. Consequently, though the federal executive
may create valid legal obligations for Australia on the international plane
by entering into a treaty, domestic law will generally not be affected by
that action unless the treaty has been implemented by legislation.'
There are various ways in which a treaty may be implemented by
legislation. The simplest method is for the legislation to declare that the
treaty provisions have the force of law in Australia.' This technique is
only available when the treaty obligations are expressed in a form suitable
for immediate incorporation into domestic law. A second method is for
the legislation to refer to the treaty but to rewrite its obligations as a
separate statutory regime.' When this method is employed, the treaty is
usually annexed to the legislation and may be used as an aid in interpret-
ing the legislation.' This technique has been widely used in the field of
human rights and anti-discrimination law, where general obligations
imposed by a treaty have been translated into detailed statutory regimes
Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, 1 D.L.R. 673, 678
(1937).
24 AUSTL. CoNsT. ch. I, §§ 51-52.
E.g., in Bradley v. Commonwealth, 128 C.L.R. 557 (1973), the High Court held
that the termination of postal and telecommunication services to the Rhodesia Informa-
tion Centre in Sydney was not justified by mandatory sanctions imposed by the U.N.
Security Council. The U.N. Charter had not been given the force of law in Australia,
and the formal "approval" of the Charter by the Charter of the United Nations Act
1945 did not have the effect of incorporating the treaty into domestic law. See infra
note 31.
2 See, e.g., Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act, AUSTL. C. AcTs No. 16, §
7 (1967); Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims Act, AUsTL. C. AcTs No. 151,
§ 6 (1989).
' See, e.g., World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, AusTL. C. AcTs No. 5
(1983); Ozone Protection Act, AUSTL. C. AcTs No. 7 (1989).
Acts Interpretation Act, AusTL. C. AcTs No. 2, § 15AB (1901). See also infra
Part IV(B).
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of obligations, rights and remedies. Finally, legislation is sometimes
enacted in terms that make no mention of a particular treaty, but whose
underlying purpose is to ensure that Australian law conforms with that
treaty. 2
9
Not every treaty to which Australia becomes a party requires a
change in municipal law. There are several reasons for this. The language
of the treaty might be aspirational, or might leave a wide margin of
appreciation to States such that no specific action need be taken; existing
state and federal legislation might be adequate to give effect to the treaty
obligations such that no new legislation is required; or the treaty might
impose obligations on governments such that its implementation can be
achieved through administrative rather that legislative changes. Moreover,
certain types of treaties (for example those relating to peace and war, and
the cession of territory) belong to the Crown's historic prerogative and
require no legislative action. However, where changes to domestic law are
necessary, democratic principles are clearly at work in allowing parlia-
mentary scrutiny of the implementing legislation before the treaty be-
comes binding on Australia.3" Legislative implementation of treaties is
therefore the principal, but not the only mechanism for parliamentary
review of executive action in relation to treaties.31
" E.g., the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, AusTL. C. AcTs No. 11
(1986) is intended to implement the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,
Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, though it makes no reference to the Convention.
o This view was expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator
Gareth Evans, in the House of Representatives in 1988, when he said that "[t]he people
of Australia, through their elected representatives, determine whether necessary legis-
lation is enacted to give effect to the provision of particular treaties in Australia."
PARL. DEB., H. R., 3752 (Dec. 1, 1988), reprinted in 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 467
(1992).
"' Three further avenues for parliamentary scrutiny of executive action in relation
to treaties deserve mention. First, there is a practice of tabling treaties in Parliament for
the perusal of Members. This practice derives from a commitment made by Prime
Minister Menzies in 1961 to lay before both Houses of Parliament the text of treaties
that would not otherwise be brought to Parliament's attention. N.D. Campbell, Austra-
lian Treaty Practice and Procedure, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AuSTRALIA 53, 54
(K.W. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 1984). For those treaties that enter into force upon signature,
the tabling and debating of such treaties is of little practical importance because
Australia's international obligations will already have been engaged as a result of the
executive's prior action. For those treaties that enter into force by a step subsequent to
signature, parliamentary debate may be of greater significance provided the treaties are
tabled sufficiently early. The Commonwealth government claims to make every effort
to table such treaties before they are ratified in order to give Parliament the opportuni-
ty to express its views on the treaties. Secondly, if implementation of a treaty requires
[Vol. 27:001
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The implementation of treaties in domestic law may be achieved
through either state or federal legislation. The choice between these al-
ternatives depends both on the constitutional division of legislative power
between the state and federal spheres, and on the principle of cooperative
federalism, which creates functional divisions of responsibility between the
two levels of government. The circumstances in which reliance is placed
on state legislation are considered further below.32 In the present context
it is necessary to make some brief observations on the constitutional
power of the federal Parliament to enact laws to give effect to interna-
tional treaties to which Australia is party.33
The federal legislature is an organ whose powers are confined to
enacting laws with respect to specific subject matters enumerated in the
Australian Constitution. Section 51 gives the federal Parliament power "to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Common-
wealth" with respect to thirty-nine listed matters. Any of these heads of
power could support federal legislation implementing an international
treaty on that subject matter.' Indeed, many pieces of legislation imple-
menting international treaties, such as that giving effect to the World
Heritage Convention, have derived cumulative support from a number of
such powers.3' However, the most important head of power in the pres-
ent context is the power over "external affairs."36 The interpretation and
ambit of this power have assumed great importance in situations where
other heads of power have not been able to provide constitutional support
for the federal legislation in question.
financial outlay, and hence an appropriation of money from consolidated revenue,
federal legislation will usually be required to make the appropriation. Thirdly, the
executive used to seek the formal approval of Parliament for treaties of political signifi-
cance. E.g., the United Nations Charter was formally approved by the Charter of the
United Nations Act, AUsTRL. C. Acr, No. 32 (1945). Although this practice has now
ceased, it has been noted that between 1919 and 1963 Parliamentary approval was
sought prior to executive ratification in 55 cases. GONTHER DOEKER, THE TREATY-
MAKING PownR IN Tm COMMONwEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 138, 257-61 (1966).
32 See infra Part I1(B).
" These constitutional issues are explored in greater detail below. See infra Part
V(3) and V(C).
3 E.g., the power over taxation in § 51(ii) of the Constitution would support
federal legislation implementing an international tax treaty. See LEsLIE ZNeS, THE HIGH
COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 237 (3d ed. 1992).
31 The World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, which gives effect to
Australia's obligations under the World Heritage Convention, was drafted to rely on the
Commonwealth's power over external affairs, corporations, territories and "people of any
race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws."
' AusTL. CONST. ch. I, § 51(xxix).
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Prior to the 1980s, there was little judicial consideration of the ambit
of the external affairs power.37 In one of the earliest cases, R v. Burgess,
ex parte Henry,38 the High Court had to consider whether the Air Navi-
gation Act 1920, and regulations made thereunder, were a valid exercise
of the external affairs power insofar as they purported to give effect to
the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation.39 Al-
though the Court struck down the regulations because they failed to
conform with the terms of the Convention, the Court was unanimous in
upholding the Commonwealth's power to implement the Convention by
appropriate legislation. There were, however, differences of opinion
between members of the Court as to the ambit of the external affairs
power. Three justices took a broad view in holding that section 51(xxix)
gave the federal legislature power to implement an international treaty
whatever its subject matter.' The two other justices were prepared to
accept that the subject of air navigation had a sufficiently international
character to support appropriate implementing legislation, but denied that
section 51(xxix) allowed the implementation of any international treaty
whatsoever.4
Until the 1980s, none of the cases on the external affairs power
raised in an acute form problems of the balance of legislative power
between the state and federal spheres.42 However, beginning in 1982, the
High Court decided several important cases on the external affairs power
which had a profound impact on the distribution of power within the
Australian federation. These cases arose out of the circumstance that the
federal executive had ratified international treaties in subject areas that
were traditionally regarded as falling within state competence, namely
human rights and the environment. Attempts by the federal Parliament to
implement the treaties drew a hostile response from several states, which
" Principal early cases were R. v. Burgess ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936);
Airlines of N.S.W. Pty. Ltd. v. New South Wales (No. 2), 113 C.L.R. 54 (1965); and
New South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Seas and Submerged Lands Case), 135 C.L.R.
337 (1975). For a review of recent developments, see Andrew C. Byrnes & Hilary
Charlesworth, Federalism and the International Legal Order: Recent Developments in
Australia, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 622 (1985); Andrew C. Bymes, The Implementation of
Treaties in Australia after the Tasmanian Dams Case: The External Affairs Power and
the Influence of Federalism, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 275 (1985); Mary Crock,
Federalism and the External Affairs Power, 14 MELB. U. L. REV. 238 (1983).
3' 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936).
3 Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 174.
0 R v. Burgess, 55 C.L.R. at 608, 640-41 (Latham, C.J.), 696 (Evatt & McTiernan,
JJ.).
41 Id. at 658-59 (Starke, J.), 669 (Dixon, J.).
42 See Byrnes, supra note 37, at 286.
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regarded the creeping expansion of federal legislation as undermining the
balance of power between central and state governments.43
In several key challenges to the power of the federal Parliament to
implement treaties in areas of traditional state concern, the High Court
upheld the relevant federal legislation as a valid exercise of the external
affairs power.' In Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen45 the High Court upheld
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, implementing the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.' In
Commonwealth v. Tasmania (hereinafter Tasmanian Dam),47 Richardson
v. Forestry Commission (hereinafter Tasmanian Forests)48  and
Queensland v Commonwealth (hereinafter Daintree Rainforest),49 the
Court upheld the validity of federal legislation implementing the World
Heritage Convention.
A recurrent question in these cases, and one presaged in R v.
Burgess, ex parte Henry," was whether the mere existence of a treaty
obligation was sufficient to enliven the federal Parliament's power to
make laws with respect to external affairs, or whether the subject matter
of a treaty must additionally be of international concern. The additional
requirement was thought necessary by some judges in order to prevent a
gradual accretion of power by federal Parliament, which might in time
destroy the traditional division of powers between the states and the
centre." As Chief Justice Gibbs expressed the matter in Koowarta v.
Bjelke-Petersen:52
[i]f s.51(xxix) empowers the Parliament to legislate to give effect to
every international agreement which the executive may choose to make,
the Commonwealth would be able to acquire unlimited legislative power.
The distribution of powers made by the Constitution could in time be
completely obliterated; there would be no field of power which the
Commonwealth could not invade, and the federal balance achieved by
4 Christine Chinkin, The Conclusion and Implementation of Treaties in Federal and
Unitary States, in AUSTRALIAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING BETWEEN THE DECADES
241, 247 (Alice E.-S. Tay ed., 1990).
' The relevant cases are elaborated infra Part V.
4- 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
- Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention].
47 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983).
48 164 C.L.R. 261 (1988).
49 167 C.L.R. 232 (1989).
5o 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936).
5K Tasmanian Dam, 158 C.L.R. at 99-100 (Gibbs, CJ.), 197-98 (Wilson, J.), 302-06
(Dawson, J.) (1983).
52 153 C.L.R. 168, 198 (1982).
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the Constitution could be entirely destroyed.
In the result, these concerns did not command the assent of the
Court and the requirement that a treaty be of international concern was
rejected.53 However, the High Court's expansive interpretation of the
power to implement treaties has not meant that this power is without
constraint.' The legislation must conform with the treaty in that it must
be appropriate and adapted to achieve the objectives of the treaty. And
the international obligation must be incurred bona fide and not as a
colourable attempt to enhance the power of federal Parliament over areas
otherwise beyond its legislative competence.
The upshot of the High Court's interpretation of federal legislative
power over external affairs is that Parliament does not lack power to
implement treaties to which Australia is or intends to become a party,
whatever their subject matter. However, as demonstrated in the following
section, federal Parliament has not always been willing to use its powers
to the full extent permitted by the Constitution. Pursuant to its policy of
cooperative federalism, the Commonwealth government has frequently
involved the executive and legislative organs of state government in the
process of making and implementing Australia's international treaty
obligations.
Ill. THE ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
A. State Executives
Section 61 of the Australian Constitution vests the federal executive
power in the Queen of Australia, but it does not expressly make execu-
tive power over foreign affairs exclusive to the federal sphere of govern-
ment. The lack of express provision has provided fertile ground for
claims by Australian states that they possess some competence over
foreign relations, independently of the federal executive.
" It is doubtful whether the subject matter of a treaty can fail to be of internation-
al concern, particularly when the treaty is a multilateral standard-setting convention.
5' There are also some unanswered constitutional questions, such as whether the
external affairs power can support legislation that implements recommendations and
declarations of international organizations, where those statements fall short of creating
binding obligations for Australia. See, e.g., Donald R. Rothwell, The High Court and
the External Affairs Power: A Consideration of its Outer and Inner Limits, 15 ADEL.
L. REv. 209, 234-35 (1993). This matter particularly arises in the context of recommen-
dations by the International Labour Organisation. In relation to Australia's past
implementation of International Labour Organisation standards, see J.G. Starke, Australia
and the International Labour Organisation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 115,
120 (D.P. O'Connell ed., 1965).
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The High Court has, however, taken a robust line against this view,
and the jurisprudence of the Court emphasizes the exclusive or pre-
eminent role of the Commonwealth in the conduct of the country's
foreign affairs. As early as 1923 the High Court remarked that it was a
fallacy to treat a state of Australia as a "sovereign State.""5 Similarly, in
the Seas and Submerged Lands Case,6 Justice Murphy stated that "[t]he
[s]tates have no international personality, no capacity to negotiate or enter
into treaties, no power to exchange or send representatives to other
international persons and no right to deal with other countries, through
agents or otherwise. Their claims to international personality or to sover-
eignty are groundless . ..."
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, states have been vocal in
claiming some competence in international affairs. Prior to federation
there were signs of nascent international activity by the Australian
colonies. Towards the end of the 19th century several colonies negotiated
postal agreements with foreign countries, and in 1894 the Colonial
Conference authorized the colonies to negotiate their own commercial
treaties." After 1901 several states claimed that their emerging status in
international affairs was unchanged by federation." Today there are still
signs of direct state participation in foreign affairs, ranging from the
signing of international agreements and the maintenance of overseas
representation, to direct intrusion into national foreign policy. 9 Similar
s Commonwealth v. New South Wales, 32 C.L.R. 200, 210 (1923).
New South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Seas and Submerged Lands Case), 135
C.L.R. 337, 506 (1975).
' O'Connell, supra note 13, at 2-8. Additionally, the Imperial government ceased
the practice of automatically applying its commercial treaties to the colonies, and
granted the colonies freedom to adhere voluntarily to commercial treaties concluded be-
tween the Imperial government and foreign States.
" E.g., as late as 1974 Queensland established a Treaties Commission to advise the
state government on the benefit of various international treaties and conventions. See
Treaties Commission Act 1974 (Queensl.). The Act establishing the Commission did not
itself suggest that Queensland was competent to enter into international treaties or
conventions. However, in its First Report to the Queensland Parliament, the Commission
claimed that the Australian states could make agreements with foreign governments,
governed by international law. See Henry Burmester, The Australian States and Par-
ticipation in the Foreign Policy Process, 9 FED. L. REv. 257, 262-64 (1978).
" G. Campbell Sharman, The Australian States and External Affairs: An Exploratory
Note, 27 AusTL. OUTLOOK 307 (1973); see Burmester, supra note 58, at 262-275;
Hugh Collins, Federalism & Australia's External Relations, 39 AUSTL. OUTLOOK 123
(1985); Brian Hocking, Pluralism and Foreign Policy: The States and the Management
of Australia's External Relations, 38 Y.B. WoRLD AFF. 137, 143-44 (1984); Ravenhill,
supra note 15, at 95-104. Additional international activities undertaken by states include
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claims for state participation in international affairs have been made by
Canadian provinces, principally Quebec, in circumstances where the Cana-
dian Constitution likewise fails to identify the location of executive power
to conclude international agreements.' In the U.S. the matter is settled
by the express constitutional prohibition on states entering into agreements
or compacts with other states or foreign powers without congressional
consent.6'
More importantly for present purposes is the way in which the state
executives have participated in the treaty-making process itself through
cooperative federal-state arrangements. Since 1977 the Commonwealth
government has endeavoured to involve the states at an early stage in the
treaty-making process by facilitating consultation between the federal and
state executives on treaties to which Australia is contemplating becoming
a party. The principles of consultation have varied over the years, but in
their current form they provide for substantial involvement of the state
executives on matters of particular sensitivity or importance to the
states.62 Of course, it is ultimately a matter for the federal executive, not
the states, to decide whether participation in a treaty is in Australia's
national interest and ought to be pursued.63 However, the principles on
consultation recognize that state cooperation can facilitate the implemen-
tation of international obligations, as well as ameliorate tensions in fed-
eral-state relations. In order to facilitate this consultative process, a
Standing Committee of federal and state officials has been established and
charged with responsibility for overseeing the various stages of the pro-
cess. The work of this Committee is supplemented by existing mecha-
nisms for consultation between the federal and state executives.6
the establishment of sister-state relationships with foreign governmental units, the
granting of foreign aid and official visits by state leaders to foreign countries.
6 See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 282-83, 297-99 (3d ed.
1992).
61 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10.
62 Attorney General's Department, Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State
Consultation on Treaties (1992) (on file with authors), reprinted in 5 PUB. L. REV. 291
(1994).
' E.g., in 1991 the Commonwealth Attorney General, Mr. Duffy, indicated to Par-
liament that the Standing Committee of Attorneys General (a federal-state consultative
body) was a valuable forum for discussing with the states and territories whether or not
Australia should accede to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. However, he
stressed that the view of the Committee was not determinative because the matter was
one for decision of the Australian Government alone. PARL. DEB., H. R., 2542 (Apr.
11, 1991), reprinted in 13 AusTm. Y.B. INT'L L. 381 (1992).
' Additional mechanisms include meetings of the Standing Committee of Attorneys
General, direct communication between functional departments of the state and federal
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The consultative process comprises two aspects. First, mechanisms
have been established for the state executives to be informed at an early
stage of the treaties to which Australia is considering becoming a party.
To this end, a Treaties Schedule is circulated to the states twice a year,
with information on forthcoming treaty negotiations over the next twelve
months. This allows the states to identify treaties of special importance to
them, bearing in mind their traditional areas of responsibility; to propose
appropriate mechanisms for their involvement in the negotiation process;
and to provide input relevant to the formulation of Australian policy.
Secondly, representatives of the states may be included in delegations to
relevant international conferences. Inclusion in a delegation does not
entitle state representatives to speak for Australia, but is for the purpose
of keeping them informed and allowing them to express their views. In
general, it is for the states to initiate moves for inclusion in a delegation.
B. State Legislatures
Notwithstanding the broad powers conferred on the federal legislature
by the external affairs power, state legislatures also play a significant role
in the implementation of treaties in Australia. There are legal, admin-
istrative and political reasons for this.' The first reason is a legal one
arising from the distribution of legislative power under the Constitution.
As previously mentioned, the Constitution defines federal legislative
power by reference to enumerated subject matters. The states, on the
other hand, enjoy the plenary legislative powers formerly possessed by
the Australian colonies,' and may therefore enact laws on nearly any
subject matter. There are some limitations on the legislative power of the
states. For example, the Constitution itself vests certain powers in the
federal Parliament exclusively,67 and the extra-territorial operation of
state laws is limited by the requirement that the laws have some con-
nection with the state.' But these limitations aside, a state may enact
executives and direct communication between each state's Premier's Department and the
federal Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.
' See Campbell, supra note 22.
6 Ausm. CoNsT. ch. V, § 107.
67 E.g., § 52(i) (power to make laws with respect to places acquired by the
Commonwealth for public purposes), and § 90 (power to impose duties of customs and
excise).
' The constitution of each state confers on the legislature power to make laws for
the "peace, welfare and good government" of the state, or uses words to similar effect.
See § 5 Constitution Act 1902 (N.S.W.); § 2 Constitution Act 1867 (Queensl.); § 5
Constitution Act 1934 (S. Austl.) read in conjunction with §§ 7 and 14 of the
Australian Constitutions Act (No. 2) 1850 (Imp) (13 & 14 Vict. c. 59); § 16 Con-
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laws to implement a treaty, whatever its subject matter. 9
The second reason for the importance of states in implementing
Australia's treaty obligations is of an administrative nature. If the Com-
monwealth were to implement a treaty by legislation, it would be respon-
sible for providing the finances and administration necessary to operate
the legislative scheme. In some fields, such as nature conservation, this
would substantially duplicate administrative arrangements already in place
under state law. In such cases, the federal government often prefers to
rely on state law and existing state structures to implement Australia's
treaty obligations.
The third reason for the continued significance of state legislatures
is political. Although the federal Parliament has constitutional power to
implement treaties regardless of their subject matter, in practice it chooses
not to do so in relation to matters that fall within the traditional responsi-
bility of the states.70 Under existing federal-state consultative procedures,
stitution Act 1975 (Vict.); § 2 Constitution Act 1889 (W. Austl.). For the position in
Tasmania, see the preamble to the Constitution Act 1934 (Tas.), and § 14 of the
Australian Constitutions Act (No. 2) 1850 (Imp) (13 & 14 Vict. c. 59). A law that
purports to operate outside the territory of a state may not be one for the peace,
welfare and good government of the state. However, the nexus required between the
subject matter of the legislation and the state has been increasingly weakened over the
course of this century by judicial interpretation. In Union Steamship Co. of Austl. Pty.
Ltd. v. King, 166 C.L.R. 1 (1988), the High Court unanimously endorsed this liberal
approach in stating, that:
the requirement for a relevant connexion between the circumstances on which the legis-
lation operates and the [s]tate should be liberally applied and . . . even a remote and
general connexion between the subject-matter of the legislation and the [s]tate will
suffice.
Id. at 14 (aff'd, Port MacDonnell Professional Fishermen's Ass'n Inc. v. South Austra-
lia, 168 C.L.R. 340, 372 (1989)).
The same result is probably achieved by § 2(1) of the Australia Acts 1986,
AUSTL. C. Acrs No. 142 (1985), which were enacted simultaneously by the U.K. and
the Commonwealth to clarify the constitutional powers of the states. The section
declares that "the legislative powers of the Parliament of each [s]tate include full power
to make laws for the peace, order and good government of that state that have extra-
territorial operation."
' If a state law is inconsistent with a federal law, the federal law prevails. AUSTL.
CONST. ch. V, § 109. However, in the absence of inconsistency, state laws may coexist
with federal laws, or may exist independently of federal laws, as a means of imple-
menting Australia's treaty obligations.
70 This attitude of cooperation is reflected in the Attorney General's Department's
Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties (1992),
which state:
The Commonwealth will consider relying on [s]tate legislation where the treaty affects
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agreement is sought between both levels of government as to the manner
in which the treaty obligations are to be implemented, whether it be by
complementary federal and state legislation or by state or federal legisla-
tion alone. The organs of state government may thus have a role in the
Australian treaty process beyond the participation of the state executives
in treaty negotiation.
An interesting example of the constitutional and political significance
of the states in implementing treaties may be found in the history of
legislation implementing Australia's obligations under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.7
In 1975 the Commonwealth Parliament enacted the Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 to give effect to the Convention. In 1982 the Act was upheld
by the High Court as a valid exercise of the federal legislative power
over external affairs.72 In the following year, the question arose in
Viskauskas v. Niland3 whether New South Wales legislation prohibiting
discrimination on the ground of race74 was consistent with the federal
legislation, such that the two Acts could operate concurrently. The High
Court held that the federal Act was intended to "cover the field" of racial
discrimination in fulfillment of Australia's obligations under the Conven-
tion, and that it accordingly left no room for the operation of the state
Act.
It soon became apparent, however, that the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment had not intended to exclude the operation of state anti-discrimination
law. Within a week of the High Court's judgment an amendment was
introduced into the House of Representatives to reduce the coverage of
the federal Act.7' During its passage through the House, the Minister for
Trade, Mr. Bowen, stated that federal measures should not impinge upon
constructive developments that had taken place in some states in the field
of anti-discrimination law. 6 Accordingly, section 6A was inserted in the
an area of particular concern to the [s]tates and this course is consistent with the na-
tional interest and the effective and timely discharge of treaty obligations. However, the
Commonwealth does not accept that it is appropriate for the Commonwealth to commit
itself in a general way not to legislate in areas that are constitutionally subject to Com-
monwealth power.
' Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 46, 1975 Austl. T.S. No. 40. The
Convention entered into force for Australia on Oct. 30, 1975.
Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
7 153 C.L.R. 280 (1983).
74 §§ 6-22 Anti-Discrimination Act, No. 48 (N.S.W.) (1977). The Act also pro-
scribes discrimination on other grounds (e.g. sex, marital status), but only the provisions
relating to racial discrimination were impugned in the case.
' See Racial Discrimination Amendment Act, No. 38 (1983).
76 PARL. DEn., H. R., 923-24 (May 25, 1983).
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federal Act, and stipulated that "[t]his Act is not intended, and shall be
deemed never to have been intended, to exclude or limit the operation of
a law of a [s]tate or Territory that furthers the objects of the Convention
and is capable of operating concurrently with this Act."
The effect of this provision was considered by the High Court in
University of Wollongong v. Metwally,' where it was held that the pro-
vision did not cure the inconsistency between the federal and state anti-
discrimination laws prior to the commencement of section 6A of the
federal Act. However, the prospective operation of section 6A was not
expressly considered by the Court and it has generally been assumed that
the federal Act and the New South Wales anti-discrimination legislation
are now capable of standing side by side as cooperative implementation
of Australia's obligations under the Convention.78 Today most states
have anti-discrimination legislation of the kind considered in Viskauskas
v. Niland, and the coexistence of federal and state legislation implement-
ing international conventions has become commonplace in the field of
human rights.79
The reliance on state legislation to implement Australia's treaty
obligations was for many years reflected in Australia's practice of seeking
the inclusion of federal clauses in international treaties."s One federal
clause commonly advocated by Australia limited Australia's international
obligations whenever the provisions of the relevant convention fell within
the legislative jurisdiction of the constituent states of the federation. In
such a case, the federal government was obliged only to bring the
convention provisions to the notice of the relevant state authorities with
a recommendation that they be adopted. The pursuit of federal clauses in
international negotiations was strongly advocated in 1976 by the newly
elected conservative federal government. Following a policy of cooperat-
ive federalism, the federal Guidelines on Treaty Consultation (1977)
7 158 C.L.R. 447 (1984).
7 Cf Greg McCarry, Landmines Among the Landmarks: Constitutional Aspects of
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 63 AusTL. L.J. 327 (1989).
7' E.g., the preamble to the Anti-Discrimination Act, No. 85 (Queensl.) (1991) states
that the Queensland Parliament supports the Commonwealth's ratification of international
human rights instruments, including the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. After acknowledging the existence of federal
legislation in fulfillment of Australia's obligations under these instruments, the preamble
stipulates that state legislation is necessary to extend the federal legislation, to apply it
consistently throughout the state and to ensure that determinations of unlawful conduct
are enforceable in courts of law.
' Henry Burmester, Federal Clauses: An Australian Perspective, 34 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 522 (1985).
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provided that "federal clauses will be sought to be included in treaties in
appropriate cases. ' '"i State governments strongly supported this policy
because it was perceived to be a commitment on the part of the Com-
monwealth to rely on state legislation in areas of traditional state concern.
With a change of federal government in 1983, the policy of seeking the
inclusion of federal clauses was abandoned, and this remains the position
today.8
2
There were several reasons for this change in policy. First, the High
Court's decision in Tasmanian Dam3 in 1983 effectively deprived the
Commonwealth of the constitutional basis for pressing for the inclusion
of federal clauses in international treaty negotiations. There was no longer
uncertainty about the competence of the federal Parliament to implement
Australia's treaty obligations, and any claim that the subject matter of a
treaty fell solely within the legislative jurisdiction of states was thus
disingenuous. Secondly, Australia met with limited success in pursuing its
claims for federal clauses during the period in which that was government
policy. The international community disfavoured federal clauses because
they detracted from the mutuality of treaty obligations; countries with a
federal system of government were able to plead the deficiencies of their
internal constitutional arrangements to lessen their obligations vis 6 vis
other countries. Moreover, as many treaty negotiations demonstrated, Aus-
tralia could not always rely on the support of other federations because
each sought a federal clause in terms appropriate to its own domestic
position. Thirdly, the negotiation of such clauses consumed a significant
amount of time and effort and diverted resources from the pursuit of
SI Id. at 530.
The current Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on
Treaties (1992) state that "[t]he Commonwealth does not favour the inclusion of federal
clauses in treaties and does not intend to instruct Australian delegations to seek such
inclusion." However, notwithstanding the disfavour with which the federal government
currently regards federal clauses, a practice has developed of making a unilateral
"federal statement" on signing or ratifying certain treaties. The statement is generally
in the following terms:
Australia has a federal constitutional system in which legislative, executive and judicial
powers are shared or distributed between its central, [s]tate and territory authorities. The
implementation of the treaty throughout Australia will be effected by the Federal, [s]tate
and Territory governments having regard to their respective constitutional powers and
arrangements concerning their exercise.
The statement is generally made where it is intended that the states will play a role
in the legislative implementation of the treaty. An example of the use of the federal
statement is Australia's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, No. 9 (1983).
158 C.L.R. 1 (1983).
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more substantive issues in treaty negotiation.'
There is no doubt that reliance on state legislation for the implemen-
tation of some treaty obligations has been important in maintaining
harmonious relations between state and federal governments. However,
there is equally little doubt that it has given rise to considerable difficul-
ties, which are elaborated in the case studies and the conclusion in Parts
V, VI and VII below. These difficulties include uncertainties of constitu-
tional interpretation; delays in assuming or fulfilling international treaty
obligations; lack of uniformity in Australian implementing legislation; and
the danger of a state placing Australia in breach of its international
obligations by legislating inconsistently with the treaty.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The Australian court system is a complex one that reflects the
federal nature of the Constitution.85 Each state and territory has its own
system of superior courts and there is also a system of federal courts
comprising a number of specialized tribunals and the High Court of
Australia.86 Despite these separate state and federal court structures, in
many respects the Australian judicature operates as a unified court system.
This is because the High Court serves as a general court of appeal for
federal and non-federal matters, 7 state courts are invested with federal
jurisdiction" and the jurisdiction of federal courts and superior state
courts is cross-vested pursuant to a nationwide statutory scheme. 9 The
importance of this for present purposes is that questions pertaining to
Australia's treaty obligations may arise and be dealt with in any Austra-
lian court, be it a state, territory or federal court.
In order to understand the role of the courts in respect of Australia's
treaty obligations it is necessary to distinguish between the courts'
function in reviewing executive action in relation to the conduct of
foreign affairs, and its role in superintending the implementation of
treaties in Australia. The former is principally concerned with the extent
84 Burmester, supra note 80, at 536-37; Principles and Procedures for Common-
wealth-State Consultation on Treaties (1992).
8 See JAMES CRAWFORD, AUSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAW 23-57 (3d ed. 1993).
' The federal courts, with dates of their establishment, are: the High Court of
Australia (1903), the Family Court of Australia (1975), the Federal Court of Australia
(1976) and the Industrial Relations Court of Australia (1994).
87 Ausm. CONST. ch. III, § 73.
g' Ausm. CONST. ch. III, § 77 (iii), and Judiciary Act, AusTL. C. ACTs No. 6, §
39(2) (1903).
89 See Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act, No. 24 (1987), and cognate state
and territory legislation.
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to which the courts are willing to supervise the treaty-making power of
the executive, while the latter is concerned with the use that courts make
of treaties in interpreting and developing domestic law.
A. Supervision of the Treaty-Making Power
Judicial supervision of the executive's treaty-making power reflects
an underlying tension between the function of the courts as guardians of
the Constitution, on the one hand, and an attitude of self-restraint in
reviewing the conduct of the political arms of government, on the other.
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Baker v. Carr,' "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance," but finding the appropriate
balance is often a difficult task.
In their role as interpreters of the Constitution, Australian courts have
occasionally been willing to adjudicate on the question of whether the
treaty actions of government fall within the scope of the federal executive
power conferred by section 61 of the Constitution.9' Thus an allegation
of lack of constitutional power is one for judicial determination, though
a question that goes merely to the propriety of the executive's action
within the scope of its constitutional powers over foreign relations is not
justiciable. The High Court, in particular, has been vigilant in maintaining
its role as final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution.92
369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
+' See, e.g., Barton v. Commonwealth, 131 C.L.R. 477 (1974); Re Ditford ex parte
Deputy Comm'r of Taxation (N.S.W.), 83 A.L.R. 265, 285-86 (1988). However, courts
are often reluctant to decide such questions unless it is necessary to do so. E.g., in
Horta v. Commonwealth, 123 A.L.R. 1 (1994), certain Australian residents from East
Timor argued that the Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the
Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, Austl.-Indon.,
1991 Austl. T.S. No. 9, was not within the executive power of the Commonwealth be-
cause the treaty was void under international law. The basis of the claim was that, in
concluding a treaty with Indonesia relating to the use of maritime areas adjacent to the
coast of the disputed territory of East Timor, Australia had violated the right of the
East Timorese people to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over their natural
resources. The Court went to some lengths to avoid having to decide whether the
plaintiffs' allegations were justiciable, and rejected the claim on other grounds.
92 E.g., in Bonser v. La Macchia, 122 C.L.R. 177, 193 (Barwick, C.J.), 207 (Kitto,
J.), 217 (Windeyer, J.) (1969), several judges stated emphatically that it was for the
High Court, and not the executive, to determine the extent of "Australian waters" for
the purpose of interpreting federal legislative power over "fisheries in Australian waters
beyond territorial limits" within § 51(x) of the Constitution. The High Court's central
role arises from the circumstance that the Court has original, but not exclusive,
jurisdiction in any matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.
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In contrast to this constitutional role, courts are often cautious in
reviewing the exercise of the executive's treaty-making power. Through
the use of numerous doctrines of self-restraint, courts frequently defer to
the decisions of other branches of government in the field of foreign
affairs. In this context it has frequently been observed that matters arising
out of the conduct of Australia's international relations are non-justicia-
ble93 because review of the executive's decisions to enter into treaties
would undermine the executive's effective control of foreign policy.'
There are several techniques by which Australian courts decline to
review the actions of the executive branch of government in matters of
foreign affairs. Among these are the political question doctrine, restric-
tions on a person's standing to sue and deference to executive certificates.
Under the political question doctrine, a court will decline to adjudicate an
overtly political question that might take the court beyond its true func-
tion and into the province of other branches of government.95 In one
AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 76(i) and Judiciary Act, AusTL. C. ACTS No. 6, § 30 (1903).
Moreover, any such matter pending in another court may be removed into the High
Court for determination. Judiciary Act, AUSTL. C. ACTS No. 6, § 40 (1903).
9 Minister for Arts, Heritage and Env't v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd., 75 A.L.R. 218, 253
(1987). See also Peter Cane, Prerogative Acts, Acts of State and Justiciability, 29 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 680 (1980).
' See Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168, 229 (Mason, J.) (1982). This
approach is similar to that taken by courts in the U.K. In Blackburn v. Attorney-
General, 1 W.L.R. 1037 (1971), Lord Denning M.R. remarked, when reviewing the
executive's pending decision to become a party to the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, that:
[tihe treaty-making power of this country rests not in the courts, but in the Crown; that
is, Her Majesty acting upon the advice of her Ministers. When her Ministers negotiate
and sign a treaty, even a treaty of such paramount importance as this proposed one,
they act on behalf of the country as a whole. They exercise the prerogative of the
Crown. Their action in so doing cannot be challenged or questioned in these courts.
Id. at 1040.
' Gerhardy v. Brown, 159 C.L.R. 70, 138-39 (Brennan, J.) (1985); Alex C. Castles,
Justiciability: Political Questions, in Locus STANDI 202 (Leslie A. Stein ed., 1979); see
generally Geoffrey Lindell, The Justiciability of Political Questions: Recent Develop-
ments, in AUSTRAIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES 180 (H.P. Lee & George
Winterton eds., 1992) (examining the political questions doctrine and its relevance in
the U.S. and elsewhere). Under the Australian Constitution, courts exercising federal
jurisdiction may only adjudicate "matters," as that term is understood in its constitution-
al setting. AusTL. CONST. ch. III, §§ 75-77. Like the analogous term "cases and con-
troversies" in art. HI, § 2(1) of the U.S. Constitution, the notion of a "matter" has
excluded the adjudication of overtly political questions. For a critique of the U.S.
political question doctrine, see Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doc-
trine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Louis HENKiN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY,
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case an applicant sought a declaration from the High Court that certain
federal Ministers were acting in breach of international human rights
standards and in breach of the Australian Constitution in failing to impose
an embargo on the sale of arms to "repressive" foreign governments.96
In the course of dismissing an allied claim, Justice Brennan stated that it
was essential to understand that courts performed a different function to
the executive, and that the applicant had mistaken the branch of govern-
ment to which his plea must be directed.'
A second mechanism for limiting review of foreign affairs decisions
stems from the common law rules relating to standing to sue.9" Under
the law relating to standing, a member of the public who has no greater
interest than any other person in upholding the law has no standing to
prevent the violation of a public right or to enforce the performance of
a public duty.9 A mere intellectual or emotional concern does not suf-
fice to give a person standing to sue; rather, the person must have a
"special interest in the subject matter of the action."'" These rules have
special bearing on judicial review of foreign affairs decisions. In the
absence of implementing legislation, dealings between Australia and for-
eign States will not normally create rights for or impose obligations on
individuals."1 Accordingly, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to demon-
strate the special interest that makes his or her claim rise above those of
other ordinary members of the public."
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79-91 (1990).
Re Limbo, 64 A.L.J.R. 241 (1989).
Id. at 242-43.
" See Castles, supra note 95; AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REP. No.
27, STANDING IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION, (1985); Henry Burmester, Locus Standi
in Constitutional Litigation, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTVES, supra note
95, at 148.
' Australian Conservation Found. v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 493 (1980); Onus
v. Alcoa of Austl. Ltd., 149 C.L.R. 27 (1981); Davis v. Commonwealth, 61 A.LJ.R.
32 (1986).
" In 1985 the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended that the law re-
lating to standing be liberalized, and that any person should have standing to initiate
public interest litigation unless a court finds that the person instituting proceedings is
"merely meddling." AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra note 98, at xxi.
t'o Ingram v. Commonwealth, 54 A.L.J.R. 395 (1980); Simsek v. Macphee, 148
C.L.R. 636 (1982); Tasmanian Wilderness Society Inc. v. Fraser, 153 C.L.R. 270, 274
(Mason, J.) (1982).
"0 This was demonstrated in Ingram v. Commonwealth, 54 A.LJ.R. 395 (1980). In
that case the plaintiff sought a declaration from the High Court to the effect that the
Commonwealth and the Minister for Foreign Affairs were in breach of international law
by supporting the SALT II Treaty between the U.S. and the former U.S.S.R. See
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A final restriction on the role of the courts in reviewing the conduct
of Australia's foreign affairs arises from the deference paid by the
judiciary to certificates issued by the federal executive indicating its
attitude to certain matters relating to Australia's foreign affairs. °3 At
common law, executive certificates are generally regarded as conclusive
of the facts stated in them," in the sense that evidence is not admissi-
ble to contradict the certificates and certificates cannot be questioned in
proceedings for judicial review.0 5 Judicial obeisance to such certificates
is intended to avoid the courts and the executive speaking with different
voices on matters pertaining to the country's foreign affairs.
B. The Use of Treaties in Domestic Law
Australian courts may have regard to a treaty to which Australia is
Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), June 18, 1979, U.S.-
U.S.S.R. (signed but not ratified), S. ExEc. Doc., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 1138 (1979). The basis of the claim was the
plaintiff's belief that the SALT II Treaty enhanced the danger of nuclear war and con-
flicted with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 1973 Austl. T.S. No. 3, to which Australia is a party.
In striking out the claim, Gibbs, A.C.J., acknowledged the plaintiff's deep concern for
the issues in question, but denied that they amounted to a special interest because "an
interest is not special if it is one which is shared with the public at large." Ingram,
54 A.L.J.R. at 397. Accordingly, the alleged breach of international law was not a
matter justiciable in Australian courts at the suit of a private citizen who could show
neither a breach of his private rights nor a special interest in vindicating a public right.
03 There are many matters about which the executive may issue certificates. These
include the existence or recognition of a foreign state, the recognition of a person as
a diplomatic agent or consular officer, the existence of a state of war and the extent
of territorial claims.
'04 A.B. Lyons, The Conclusiveness of the Foreign Office Certificate, 23 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 240 (1946); W.R. Edeson, Conclusive Executive Certificates in Australian Law,
7 AuSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 16 (1981); Colin Warbrick, Executive Certificates in For-
eign Affairs: Prospects for Review and Control, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 138 (1986).
"0 Re Ditford; ex parte Deputy Comm'r of Taxation (N.S.W.), 83 A.L.R. 265, 285
(1988). The importance of this issue is probably in decline. The federal Parliament has
increasingly given legislative foundation to executive certificates in terms that indicate
that certificates are only evidence of the facts stated in the certificate and are not
conclusive. See also Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act, AUSTL. C. Acrs No.
16, § 14 (1967); Consular Privileges and Immunities Act, AusTL. C. ACrs No. 62, §
12 (1972); International Organisations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, AusTL. C. ACTS
No. 50, § 11 (1963); Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act, AusTL. C. ACTS
No. 8, § 14 (1976); Duff v. R, 39 F.L.R. 315, 356 (1979). In contrast to these
provisions, some recent federal legislation retains the common law practice of exclusive
executive certification; see, e.g., Foreign State Immunities Act, No. 196, § 40 (1985).
[Vol. 27:001
TREATY IMPACT ON AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM
a party both when the treaty has been incorporated into domestic law
through appropriate legislation and, in some circumstances, when it has
not been incorporated."° This reflects a general principle of statutory
construction that, in cases of ambiguity, courts should favour a construc-
tion that accords with Australia's international treaty obligations."W
When a treaty has been implemented by means of federal legislation,
federal law expressly identifies the use that may be made of the treaty in
interpreting the implementing legislation. In particular, section 15AB of
the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 permits reference to a treaty referred to
in an Act where this is necessary to resolve an ambiguity or obscurity in
the legislation, or where the ordinary meaning of the legislation leads to
a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. However, the courts
have tended to take a rather narrow view of section 15AB in holding
that, where there is no ambiguity in the text of the legislation, a doubt
cannot be created by reference to the treaty itself."5 When a treaty has
been implemented by means of state legislation, section 15AB is inappli-
cable, but it would appear that reference can still be made to the relevant
treaty under common law principles of statutory interpretation."° Addi-
tionally, it is clear that when courts have occasion to refer to a treaty,
international law rules of treaty interpretation rather than domestic rules
of statutory construction should be applied."'
,16 See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, AUSTRALIAN BRANCH, REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MUNICIPAL COURTS (1993) (on file with authors).
"0 Chu Kheng Lim v. Minister for Immigration, 176 C.L.R. 1, 38 (Brennan, Deane
& Dawson JJ.) (1992) (considering the detention of persons pending determination of
refugee status).
" See I.C.I. Australia Operations Pty. Ltd. v. Fraser, 106 A.L.R. 257, 262-63
(1992); Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v. Magno, 112 A.L.R. 529, 534-35
(Gummow, J.) (1992).
"o See R. v. Home Secretary; ex parte Brind, 1 A.C. 696, 747-48 (Lord Bridge of
Harwich) (1991); D.C. PEARCE & R.S. GEDDES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN Aus-
TRALIA 42-45 (3d ed. 1988).
.. See Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Gamlen Chem. Co. (A/Asia) Pty. Ltd., 147
C.L.R. 142, 159 (1980) (interpretation of the International Convention for the Uni-
fication of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 120
L.N.T.S. 155, as amended); Tasmanian Dam, 158 C.L.R. 1, 94 (Gibbs, C.J.), 222
(Brennan, J.) (1983) (interpretation of World Heritage Convention); Thiel v. Federal
Comm'r of Taxation, 171 C.L.R. 338, 349 (Dawson, J.), 356 (McHugh, J.) (1990)
(interpretation of Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income, Feb. 28, 1980, Austl.-Switz., 1981 Austl. T.S. No. 5); S.S. Pharma-
ceutical Co. v. Qantas Airways, 22 N.S.W.L.R. 734 (1988) (interpretation of the
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11), aff'd I Lloyd's Rep. 288 (1991).
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When a treaty has not been implemented in Australia by domestic
legislation, the situation is more subtle. It is a well-settled principle that
an unincorporated treaty has no direct legal effect upon the rights and
duties of Australian citizens and that a treaty does not become a part of
Australian law merely by virtue of its ratification by the executive."'
However, this does not mean that an unincorporated treaty is of no effect
whatever. In recent years there has been a growing tendency for Austra-
lian courts to have regard to norms established by international treaties
for the purpose of deciding cases where domestic law, be it constitutional,
statute or common law, is uncertain or incomplete."' This trend has
been most pronounced in relation to universal human rights norms
established by the numerous conventions and covenants concluded since
the Second World War."' The willingness of the courts to have regard
to international developments represents a marked departure from the
.. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168, 224-25 (1982). This position may
be contrasted with the position in the U.S., where some treaties are self-executing and
create rights and liabilities without the need for legislation by Congress.
1' Unincorporated treaties may be used by the courts for other purposes. Thus
courts have sometimes held that the provisions of an unincorporated treaty must be
taken into account by federal administrative decisionmakers in exercising a discretion
conferred on them by statute. E.g., in Teoh v. Minister for Immigration, Local Gov't
and Ethnic Affairs, 121 A.L.R. 436 (1994), the appellant, a Malaysian citizen, had been
refused residency status in Australia by a delegate of the Minister in circumstances that
would have caused the appellant to be separated from his wife and children, who were
all Australian citizens. On appeal, the Federal Court upheld the appellant's claim that
he had been denied natural justice because of the delegate's failure to take into account
the effect of the decision on the children. In the Court's opinion, at 443 (Black, Ci.),
449-50 (Lee, J.), 466 (Carr, J.), the delegate ought to have considered the principles set
out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1991 Austl. T.S. No.
4, which Australia ratified on Dec. 17 1990, but which had not relevantly been made
part of domestic law. In the words of Justice Lee:
ratification of the Convention by the executive was a statement to the national and in-
ternational community that the Commonwealth recognised and accepted the principles of
the Convention. That statement provided parents and children . .. with a legitimate
expectation that [Commonwealth] actions would be conducted in a manner which
adhered to the relevant principles of the Convention .... After executive ratification of
the Convention persons exercising delegated administrative powers to make decisions
which concerned children were expected to apply the broad principles of the Convention
in so far as it was consonant with the national interest and not contrary to statutory
provisions to do so.
Id. at 449-50. See also Gunaleela v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 74
A.L.R. 263, 280 (1987) (examining subject matter, scope and purpose of Migration Act
1958).
"' This issue assumes considerable importance in Australia, where there is neither
a constitutional nor statutory Bill of Rights.
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insularity that has characterised the judiciary's attitude toward sources of
Australian law in the past. This change of attitude has been encouraged
in Commonwealth countries by statements such as the Bangalore Princi-
ples,' which declare that:
It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well-established
judicial functions for national courts to have regard to international
obligations which a country undertakes - whether or not they have been
incorporated into domestic law - for the purpose of removing ambiguity
or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation or common
law.115
For some time, the cause of the Bangalore Principles was prosecuted by
only a few judges in Australia."6 However, in 1992 the High Court
gave its imprimatur to the use of unincorporated treaties in Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 2]."' In that case Justice Brennan, with whom Chief
"" The Principles were established at a high-level judicial colloquium on the
domestic application of international human rights norms, held at Bangalore, India, on
Feb. 24-26, 1988. See Miscellaneous, Some Notes, The Bangalore Principles on the
"Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms," 14 COMMONWEALTH L.
BuLL. 1196 (1988). For a personal reflection on the influence of the Bangalore
Principles on the exercise of the judicial function, see Kirby, supra note 22.
"' Justice M.D. Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by
Reference to International Human Rights Norms, 62 AusTL. U. 514 app. at 531-32
(1988).
116 Principally among them was the President of the New South Wales Court of
Appeal, Justice Kirby. See Daemar v. Industrial Comm'n of New South Wales, 12
N.S.W.L.R. 45, 53 (1988) (considering international obligations in a bankrupt's right of
access to courts); S & M Motor Repairs Pty. Ltd. v. Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd., 12
N.S.W.L.R. 358, 360-61 (1988) (recognizing international obligations in the indepen-
dence and impartiality of judiciary); Jago v. District Court of New South Wales, 12
N.S.W.L.R. 558, 569-70 (1988) (recognizing the international right of accused to a
speedy trial), aff'd, 168 C.L.R. 23 (1989); Gradidge v. Grace Bros. Pty. Ltd., 93 F.L.R.
414, 422 (1988) (recognizing the right of litigant to court interpreter in civil proceed-
ings); Cachia v. Hanes, 23 N.S.W.L.R. 304, 312-13 (1991) (recognizing the recover-
ability of cost of legal representation); Gill v. Walton, 25 N.S.W.L.R. 190, 206 (1991)
(recognizing the double jeopardy in disciplinary proceedings against a medical practitio-
ner); Smith v. R., 25 N.S.W.L.R. 1, 15 (1991) (recognizing the reasonableness of fine
for contempt of court); R. v. Greer, 62 A. Crim. R. 442, 450-51 (1992) (recognizing
the right to legal representation in criminal trials); R. v. Astill, 63 A. Crim. R. 148,
157-58 (1992) (recognizing the right of accused to question witnesses whose evidence
might be exculpatory); Director of Pub. Prosecutions (Cth) v. Saxon, 28 N.S.W.L.R.
263, 274 (1992) (recognizing the right of accused to use of property for defence of
criminal proceedings).
117 175 C.L.R. 1 (1992). In earlier cases, Justice Murphy had been a largely solitary
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Justice Mason and Justice McHugh concurred, stated that:
The opening up of international remedies to individuals pursuant to
Australia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights brings to bear on the common
law the powerful influence of the Covenant and the international stan-
dards it imports. The common law does not necessarily conform with
international law, but international law is a legitimate and important
influence on the development of the common law, especially when
international law declares the existence of universal human rights."'
The use now made of unincorporated treaties in Australia, and the
limitations on that use, may be illustrated by reference to a High Court
decision delivered shortly after Mabo. In Dietrich v. R.," 9 the Court had
to consider whether the common law recognised the right of an accused
person to legal representation in a criminal trial. The accused in that case
was charged under federal law with the offence of importing a trafficable
quantity of heroin into Australia. His applications for public legal assis-
tance were unsuccessful, and he was consequently unrepresented at trial,
where he was duly convicted. On appeal to the High Court, the accused
argued that one source of the right to legal representation at the expense
of the State was to be found in Australia's obligations under the
ICCPR. 20 The relevant provision of the Covenant had not been incorpo-
rated into Australian law by legislation. Nevertheless, in deciding whether
the trial had miscarried by reason of the accused's lack of legal represen-
tation, a majority of the Court acknowledged that, where the common law
is uncertain, judges may look to Australia's international treaty obligations
as an aid to the explanation and development of the common law.' In
voice on the High Court in upholding the relevance of international human rights stan-
dards in deciding domestic cases. See Dowal v. Murray, 143 C.L.R. 410, 429-30 (1978)
(concerning custody of children); Mclnnis v. R., 143 C.L.R. 575, 588 (1979) (concern-
ing the right to legal representation in criminal trials); Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153
C.L.R. 168, 238-40 (1982) (concerning proscription of racial discrimination).
"' Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 42.
19 177 C.L.R. 292 (1992). See also Young v. Registrar, Court of Appeal [No. 3],
32 N.S.W.L.R. 262 (1992).
" Art. 14(3) provides:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to
the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: . .. (d) To be tried in his presence,
and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be
informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without pay-
ment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it.
ICCPR, supra note 10, at 176-77.
"'t Dietrich, 177 C.L.R. at 306 (Mason, C.J. & McHugh, J.), 321 (Brennan, J.), 360
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the circumstances of the case, this principle did not assist the accused,
since the Court was not being asked to resolve an uncertainty or ambi-
guity in domestic law, but to declare the existence of a right that had
hitherto never been recognised. However, the majority of the Court went
on to declare that the common law recognised the right of an accused to
a fair trial, which might be jeopardized in particular cases by a lack of
legal representation. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Court
was influenced by the international developments in declaring this new
common law right, even if the international developments were not
determinative of the case at bar.
As Dietrich v. R. demonstrates, the move towards increasing judicial
use of unincorporated international norms has been a cautious one. This
may be in part for the pragmatic reason that many judges are still
unfamiliar with relevant international instruments and the jurisprudence of
international tribunals that interpret those instruments. However, the cau-
tious attitude may also be for the principled reason that the judiciary
should not usurp the function of the legislature by implementing indirect-
ly provisions of international treaties, which the legislature has declined
to implement directly." It is for this reason that judges have generally
looked to unincorporated treaties only when there is an acknowledged gap
or ambiguity in existing law. Although little use has been made of un-
incorporated treaties outside the field of human rights, within that field
judicial interpretation is increasingly likely to narrow the gulf between
international norms and Australia's domestic law, notwithstanding the
legislature's failure to implement some treaty provisions to which Austra-
lia has expressed its consent to be bound.
V. CASE STUDY: PROTECTION OF PROPERTY UNDER THE WORLD
HERITAGE CONVENTION
During the 1980s the High Court of Australia considered various
aspects of the Commonwealth Parliament's power over "external affairs."
(Toohey, J.). Justice Brennan nonetheless dissented on the ground that it would be an
unwarranted intrusion into the legislative and executive functions of government for the
Court to declare a new common law entitlement to legal aid. Id. at 321. His Honour
acknowledged, however, that the ICCPR was a "legitimate influence on the development
of the common law" and a "concrete indication of contemporary values" of criminal
justice. ld. Justice Dawson also dissented, stating that it was "not so clearly estab-
lished" whether an unincorporated treaty could be used to resolve ambiguity in the
common law, as opposed to statute. Id. at 349.
"2 See Justice Michael D. Kirby, The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights
by Reference to International Human Rights Norms, 62 AUSTL. LJ. 514, 519-24 (1988);
Dietrich, 177 C.L.R. at 315-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1992).
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In each case the question at issue was whether section 51(xxix) of the
Australian Constitution conferred power upon the federal Parliament to
implement the terms of a treaty to which Australia had become a party.
In the first case, Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen,' 3 the Court failed to
reach a common view on this issue." However, in 1983 the Court held
in Tasmanian Dam"5 that the Commonwealth's power extended to the
implementation of treaties to which Australia was a party without the
need to demonstrate any particular international obligation upon Australia
to legislate on the subject matter of the treaty. 26 In two subsequent
decisions, Tasmanian Forests.. and Daintree Rainforest,"2 the High
Court further expanded the scope of the external affairs power. A com-
mon link between the latter three cases, apart from the Commonwealth's
reliance on the external affairs power, was that in each case the Com-
monwealth was seeking to protect an area of property which had been
placed on the World Heritage List. The List, maintained by the World
Heritage Committee, creates a protective regime for significant areas of
the world's cultural and natural heritage under the World Heritage
2153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
12 See Current Topics, The Plentitude of the External Affairs Power, 56 AusTL. L.
381 (1982); P.H. Lane, The Federal Parliament's External Affairs Power: Koowarta's
Case, 56 AusTL. J. 519 (1982).
1- 158 C.L.R. 1 (1983).
"6 See MICHAEL COPER, THE FRANKLIN DAM CASE (1983); THE SOUTH WEST DAM
DISPUTE: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES (M. Somarajah ed., 1983); Byrnes &
Charlesworth, supra note 37; Crock, supra note 37; John Goldring, Initial Reactions to
the Dam Case: Dams or Floodgates?, 8 LEGAL SERVICE BULL. 156 (1983); P.H. Lane,
The Federal Parliament's External Affairs Power: The Tasmanian Dam Case, 57
AusTL. J. 554 (1983); Philip McNamara, The Implementation of Treaties in Australia,
24 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 41 (1986); Geoffrey Sawer, The External Affairs Pow-
er, 14 FED. L. REV. 199 (1984); Philip Tighe, Environmental Values, Legalism and
Judicial Rationality: The Tasmanian Dam Case and Its Broader Political Significance,
4 ENvTL. & PLAN. L.J. 134 (1987).
'- 164 C.L.R. 261 (1988). See Donald R. Rothwell, Dams, Forests and More
External Affairs: A Case Note on Richardson v. Forestry Commission (Tas), 18
QUEENSL. L. Soc'Y. J. 507 (1988); J.G. Starke, A Major Extension of the Common-
wealth Parliament's External Affairs Power, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 319 (1988); B. Martin
Tsamenyi & Juliet Bedding, The World Heritage Convention in the High Court: A
Commentary on the Tasmanian Forests Case, 5 ENvTL. & PLAN. L.J. 232 (1988).
'2 167 C.L.R. 232 (1989). See E.K. Christie, The Daintree Rainforest Decision and
its Implications: Comment, 20 QUEENSL. L. SOC'Y. J. 223 (1990); Thomas H. Edmonds,
The Queensland Rainforest and Wetlands Conflict: Australia's External Affairs Power -
Domestic Control and International Conservation, 20 ENVTL. L. 387 (1990); Donald R.
Rothwell, The Daintree Rainforest Decision and its Implications, 20 QUEENSL. L.
Soc'Y. J. 19 (1990).
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Convention.'29 The impact of these three decisions (hereinafter World
Heritage Cases) was that, as a result of the combination of the High
Court's expanded interpretation of the external affairs power and the
opportunity that the World Heritage Convention gave to the Common-
wealth Parliament to protect certain areas of Australia, areas within the
limits of a state could fall under substantial Commonwealth control if
they had World Heritage characteristics. This had substantial implications
for Australian federalism because the Commonwealth Parliament had
never before been able to legislate comprehensively in respect of state
properties in reliance on an international treaty. The Commonwealth
Parliament also gained expanded powers over the environment.' "
A. The World Heritage Convention
The World Heritage Convention was adopted by the United Nations
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (hereafter UNESCO) Gen-
eral Conference at its 17th session in Paris on November 16, 1972. The
Convention entered into force in 1975 and, as of July 1994, had 138
parties.' 3' The Convention provides for the identification and protection of
the world's cultural and natural heritage.'32 Each State Party to the Con-
" See Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and National Heritage supra
note 9.
~ See James Crawford, The Constitution and the Environment, 13 SYDNEY L. REV.
11 (1991).
.3 For a general review of the Convention and its operation, see Ben Boer, World
Heritage Listings in Australia, 7 J. ENvTL. L. & LrTIG. 247, 249-56 (1992);Ralph 0.
Slatyer, The Origin and Evolution of the World Heritage Convention, 12 AMBo 138
(1983); Keith D. Suter, The UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 8 ENVTL. & PLAN.
L.J. 4 (1991).
,' These terms are defined in art. 1 and 2 of the Convention for the Protection of
World Cultural and National Heritage, supra note 9. Art. 1 provides:
For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as "cultural heri-
tage":
monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, ele-
ments of structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combi-
nations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of
history, art or science;
groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of
their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding
universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
sites: the works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas
including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the
historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of view.
Article 2 provides:
For the purposes of this Convention, the following shall be considered as "natural
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vention is "to identify and delineate the different properties situated on its
territory" which constitute either the world's cultural or natural heri-
tage. t33 Once properties have been identified, the contracting party that
has the properties within its territory has the "duty of ensuring the
identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to
future generations of the cultural and natural heritage."'' " To that end,
the obligations imposed on a contracting party can include taking "ap-
propriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures
necessary for the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and
rehabilitation of this heritage."'
35
Every contracting Party to the Convention is required to submit to
the World Heritage Committee136 an inventory of property which is part
of the cultural or natural heritage for inclusion on the World Heritage
List.'37 The List is to contain not only those properties forming part of
the world's cultural or natural heritage as defined in the Convention, but
also those properties considered by the Committee to possess "outstanding
universal value in terms of such criteria as it shall have established.' 38
The Convention makes clear that the List is not exhaustive, and a proper-
ty that has not been included, but nonetheless meets World Heritage
criteria, is still subject to protection.' 39 Apart from the status that a
property receives from inclusion on the World Heritage List, the only
benefit bestowed on such properties by the Convention is the eligibility
of a State Party for special assistance to secure the "protection, conser-
vation, presentation or rehabilitation of such property.""' The principal
aims of the Convention are therefore to ensure that State Parties take
heritage":
natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such
formations which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point
of view;
geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which con-
stitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal
value from the point of view of science or conservation;
natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value
from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.
133 Id. art. 3.
"4 Id. art. 4.
"5 Id. art. 5(d).
" This Committee is established by art. 8. Id. at art. 8.
117 Id. artL 11.
" Id. art. 11(2). The inclusion of property on the List requires the consent of the
State concerned. Id. art. 11(3).
139 Id. arts. 11(1) and 12.
'40 Id. art. 13(1).
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steps to conserve and protect properties that form part of the world's cul-
tural or natural heritage, and to provide special assistance to properties
included on the World Heritage List.
Australia was one of the first States to ratify the Convention'41 and
has since been an active supporter of the Convention. 42 Notwithstanding
that potential World Heritage sites may lie within the geographic bound-
aries of an Australian state and territory, only the State Party to the
Convention has responsibility for bringing forward nominations to the
World Heritage Committee. This responsibility has therefore been taken
up by the Commonwealth government in Australia. There are currently
ten Australian properties on the World Heritage List. 43 Five of these
had been listed by 1982 without any major dispute from the state or
territorial governments, and in most cases the listings had been supported
by these governments.
B. The Convention in the High Court
1. Tasmanian Dam Case
In 1982 the Commonwealth government, in cooperation with the
Tasmanian government, successfully nominated an area in southwest Tas-
mania, known as the Western Tasmanian Wilderness National Parks, for
inclusion on the World Heritage List. The Commonwealth did not imme-
diately move to protect the area, but preferred to allow continued man-
agement by Tasmania.'" However, not long thereafter it was announced
that the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission, an instrumentality of the
Tasmanian government, planned to build a dam on an area of the Frank-
lin River, which fell within the World Heritage site. This resulted in con-
'4' Australia ratified the Convention on Aug. 22, 1974.
'4 E.g., Australia served as a member of the World Heritage Committee from 1976-
83 and 1985-89.
'4 These properties are, noting their location and date of listing: Great Barrier Reef
(Queensl. 1981); Kakadu National Park (N. Terr. 1981, extended in 1987 and 1992);
Willandra Lakes Region (N.S.W. 1981); Lord Howe Island Group (N.S.W. 1982);
Tasmanian Wilderness (Tas. 1982, extended 1989); Australian East-Coast Temperate and
Sub-Tropical Rainforest Parks (N.S.W. 1986); Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park (N. Terr.
1987); Wet Tropics of Queensland (Queensl. 1988); Shark Bay (W. Austl. 1991); Fraser
Island (Queensl. 1992).
'" At the time, some of the areas that fell within the site were National Parks.
However, in Australia, National Parks are predominantly controlled by the states under
state legislation. See, e.g., National Parks and Wildlife Act, No. 47 (Tas.) (1970), Na-
tional Parks and Wildlife Act, No. 80 (N.S.W.) (1974), National Parks Act, No. 8702
(Vict.) (1975).
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siderable political controversy, and the protection of the area became a
campaign issue during the 1983 federal election. The Australian Labor
Party (hereafter A.L.P.) promised that, if elected, it would halt construc-
tion of the dam by exercising the Commonwealth's power over external
affairs - a previously untested power in relation to environmental issues.
Following its victory, the new A.L.P. government enacted the World
Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983. The Act, which is the only
statute in the world enacted to ensure domestic implementation of the
World Heritage Convention, was specifically aimed at halting construction
of the dam.'45 By relying on the external affairs power, the Common-
wealth sought to extend the operation of that power to an aspect of
Australia's domestic and national affairs in a manner that had not pre-
viously been attempted.
The legislation was subjected to immediate challenge by Tasmania on
the ground, inter alia, that it was beyond the Commonwealth Parliament's
constitutional competence over external affairs to legislate on this mat-
ter."4 Until this time, the external affairs power had been given a rather
restricted interpretation. However, in 1982 the High Court indicated that
a more liberal view was now favoured by some judges. 47 As a result,
Tasmanian Dam gave rise to considerable legal and popular interest.'
If the Court were to hold that the Commonwealth had broad powers to
implement Australia's treaty obligations, a virtually limitless range of
matters would come within Commonwealth power by virtue of the large
range of topics dealt with in international treaties.
By a majority of four to three, the Court held that the World
Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 was a valid exercise of the
external affairs power. In doing so, the majority judges discarded the test
adopted in Koowarta that a treaty had to be a matter of "international
concern" before it could be used to support domestic implementing
" Boer, supra note 131, at 260.
' The Commonwealth argued that the legislation was supported by other powers,
namely ch. I, § 51(xx) - the power over trading corporations formed within the limits
of the Commonwealth; and ch. I, § 51(xxi) - the power to make laws for the people
of any race who it is deemed necessary to make special laws. AUSTL. CONST. In this
instance it was argued that there were sites within the area of significance to Aborigi-
nal Australians.
, Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
'4 Between the High Court's 1982 decision in Koowarta and its decision in Tasma-
nian Dam the following year, there was a change in the composition of the Court.
Justice Stephen, whose view in Koowarta constituted the minimum position taken by
the majority, had retired to become Governor-General of Australia, while Justice Aitkin
had died. The new judges appointed to the court were Justices Deane and Dawson.
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legislation.'49 The majority took the view that the external affairs power
conferred authority on the Commonwealth to implement by legislation any
international treaty to which Australia was a party. As noted by Justice
Brennan:
a treaty obligation stamps the subject of the obligation with the charac-
ter of an external affair unless there is some reason to think that the
treaty had been entered into merely to give colour to an attempt to
confer legislative power upon the Commonwealth Parliament. Applying
the test... the acceptance by Australia of an obligation under the
Convention suffices to establish the power of the Commonwealth to
make a law to fulfil the obligation."5
In adopting this expansive view of section 51(xxix) of the Constitu-
tion, the majority judges also indicated that they would not question the
judgment of the government in entering into certain treaties, or in decid-
ing to implement some treaties by way of domestic legislation and not
others. As Justice Mason stated:
The fact of entry into, and of ratification of, an international convention,
evidences the judgment of the executive and of Parliament that the
subject-matter of the convention is of international character and concern
and that its implementation will benefit Australia. Whether the subject-
matter dealt with by the convention is of international concern, whether
it will yield, or is capable of yielding, a benefit to Australia, whether
non-observance by Australia is likely to lead to adverse international
action or reaction, are not questions on which the Court can readily
arrive at an informed opinion. Essentially they are issues involving nice
questions of sensitive judgment which should be left to the executive
government for determination. The Court should accept and act upon the
decision of the executive government and upon the expression of the
will of Parliament in giving legislative ratification to the treaty or
convention."'
The decision of the High Court resulted in the proposed dam not
being constructed and the World Heritage area in southwest Tasmania
being subject to continued protection. The decision also substantially
reinterpreted the extent of the external affairs power and made it possible
141 Koowarta, 153 C.L.R. 168, 216 (Stephen, J.) (1982).
" Tasmanian Dam, 158 C.L.R. 1, 218-19 (Brennan, J.). Some of the other majority
judges took a more expansive view of whether or not there was a need to demonstrate
the existence of an international obligation. See 158 C.L.R. 1, 127 (Mason, J.), 170-71
(Murphy, J.), 258 (Deane, J.) (1983).
"I Id. at 125-26.
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for the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate on a wide variety of
matters dealt with in international conventions.
2. Tasmanian Forests Case
In 1987 the Commonwealth enacted the Lemonthyme and Southern
Forests (Commission of Inquiry) Act 1987 for the purpose of establishing
a Commission of Inquiry into the World Heritage values of certain forests
in Tasmania, and implementing an interim protection regime over those
forests while the inquiry was being conducted. The Commission was
established as a result of concern over logging in the forests, and uncer-
tainty over whether the areas were eligible for protection under the World
Heritage Convention.'52
Litigation resulted after the relevant Commonwealth Minister sought
to enforce the provisions of the Act against the Tasmanian Forestry Com-
mission and a private timber operator. A constitutional question was
immediately raised and the matter went before the High Court.'53 The
two major issues were whether the Commonwealth could rely on the
World Heritage Convention to establish the Commission of Inquiry, and
whether the terms of the Convention extended to the provision of interim
protection while the inquiry was taking place. In reaching a decision, the
Court was mindful of its decision in Tasmanian Dam. Although that case
dealt with different Commonwealth legislation, it was based on the same
Convention, and the decision was therefore strong authority for the
Commonwealth's ability to legislate so as to give effect to the terms of
the Convention. As Justice Toohey remarked:
The Convention imposes an obligation on Australia as a State Party to
the Convention to ensure that effective and active measures are taken
for the protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future
generations of its cultural and natural heritage, including the taking of
legal measures to this end. This is sufficient, though not necessary, to
bring such measures within the external affairs power of the Constitu-
tion: s.51(xxix). Furthermore, the implementation of the Convention is,
independently of a specific obligation to do so, an exercise of the
external affairs power."
,52 B.M. Tsamenyi et al., Determining World Heritage Values of the Lemonthyme
and Southern Forests: Lessons from the Helsham Inquiry, 6 ENvTL. & PLAN. L.J. 79,
80-81 (1989).
' Chief Justice Mason considered the case at first instance Richardson v. Forestry
Comm'n, 73 A.L.R. 589 (1989).
" Tasmanian Forests, 164 C.L.R. 261, 332-33 (1988).
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On the first issue, the Court had no difficulty in finding that the
Commonwealth was justified in establishing the Comniission. As the
Convention placed Australia under an obligation to protect areas of World
Heritage value, it was necessary for a process to be established by which
such areas could be identified and recommended for World Heritage
listing and subsequent protection by the Commonwealth. The establish-
ment of the Commission was one such process, and it was justified under
the incidental aspect of the external affairs power."'
On the second question, namely the validity of the interim protection
measures, the Court held by a five to two majority that the legislation
was valid under the external affairs insofar as the Act relied on the
World Heritage Convention.'56 The majority judges emphasized that the
interim protection measures could be "supported as action which can
reasonably be considered appropriate and adapted to the attainment of the
object of the Convention, namely the protection of the heritage."'57 In
this respect, some members of the Court emphasized that there is no need
to demonstrate that the relevant terms of the Convention provide for the
exact measures implemented. Rather, as Justice Wilson stated:
provided a law is capable of being reasonably considered to be appropri-
ate and adapted to carrying out or giving effect to an object that im-
presses it with the character of a law with respect to external affairs, the
choice of the legislative means for achieving that object is for the
Parliament and not for the Court.'
In this instance, the activities that were prohibited during the interim
period were also those that the forestry industry was likely to engage in,
with resultant damage to the forests. Consequently, the majority consid-
ered that there was a sufficient connection between interim protection of
the forests while World Heritage Listing was under consideration and the
international obligations imposed on Australia by the terms of the Con-
vention. 9
The decision in Tasmanian Forests confirmed the approach that the
High Court had adopted in Tasmanian Dam with respect to the ability of
the Commonwealth to rely on the terms of a Convention to enact legisla-
"' Id. at 286-87 (Mason, C.J. & Brennan, J.), 313 (Deane, J.), 333-34 (Toohey, J.),
343-44 (Gaudron, J.).
"56 The majority justices were Mason, CJ., Brennan, Wilson, Dawson and Toohey,
JJ.; Deane and Gaudron, JJ. in dissent.
" Tasmanian Forests, 164 C.L.R. at 291 (Mason, C.J. & Brennan, J.), 336 (Toohey,
J. agreeing), 303 (Wilson, J. agreeing) (1988).
Id. at 303. See also id. at 327 (Dawson, J.).
I d. at 291-92 (Mason, CJ. & Brennan, J.), 336 (Toohey, J.).
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tion under the external affairs power. In addition, the decision indicated
that the Commonwealth was able to implement a range of measures in
furtherance of the purposes of the Convention, provided such measures
were "appropriate and adapted" to the terms of the Convention. In this in-
stance, permitted measures extended to the establishment of a Commission
of Inquiry to determine World Heritage values and interim protection
measures, neither of which was expressly provided for in the Convention.
3. Daintree Rainforest Case
The Daintree Rainforest is located in the northern part of
Queensland, in an area which experiences a sub-tropical climate. During
the 1980s the future status of the rainforest was the subject of consider-
able community debate. The timber industry was keen to exploit the area,
while conservationists argued for protection." The Commonwealth
government finally intervened in 1987.6 ' Relying on its previous suc-
cessful use of the World Heritage Convention to protect certain wilder-
ness areas in Tasmania, the Commonwealth decided to nominate the Wet
Tropics of Queensland for World Heritage listing. The Queensland
government opposed the nomination and claimed that the decision would
have a devastating impact upon the timber industry.'62 Nevertheless, the
Commonwealth proceeded to prepare an application for submission by
December 31, 1987.63
At the June 1988, meeting of the World Heritage Bureau, both the
Commonwealth and Queensland governments made submissions regarding
the suitability of the nominated area for World Heritage listing. At the
"6 See H. Tarlo, The Cape Tribulation Affair, 1 ENvTL. & PLAN. L.J. 106 (1984);
Z.M. Lipman, Cape Tribulation: The Legal Issues, 2 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 131, 206
(1985); Aila Keto, Australia's Tropical Rainforests: The Case for World Heritage, 15
HABITAT, Aug. 1987, at 3.
16 See Bruce Davis, Federal-State Tensions in Australian Environmental Manage-
ment: The World Heritage Issue, 6 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 66, 71-73 (1989).
" See M. Seccombe, Stage Set for Legal Duel Over Logging, SYD. MORNING HER-
ALD, Jan. 21, 1988, at 3.
" Queensland responded by challenging the Commonwealth's decision to nominate
the area for World Heritage listing, and sought an injunction from the High Court on
Dec. 24, 1987, to restrain the Commonwealth from continuing with the nomination
process. The injunction was refused on the ground that Queensland had not made out
a sufficient case to demonstrate that the area under consideration did not possess World
Heritage characteristics. Queensland v. Commonwealth, 62 A.L.J.R. 143 (1988). In the
view of Chief Justice Mason, the remedy was inappropriate because the question of
World Heritage status could still be litigated after nomination rather than a few days
before the 1987 nomination deadline.
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time it was unprecedented for a state from a federal system to participate
in the nomination process, especially as it was contesting the nomination.
An official recommendation was eventually made that the nominated area
be placed on the World Heritage List and this was confirmed when for-
mal listing took place on December 9, 1988.
The formal response of the Commonwealth government to the listing
was a Proclamation on December 15, 1988, which placed the area under
the protection of the World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983.
Amendments made on the following day to the World Heritage Properties
Conservation Regulations" gave legislative effect to the Proclama-
tion." It is important to appreciate the process followed in order for
the Commonwealth legislation to become operative in this instance.
Before the Proclamation could be made, it was necessary for the area to
be considered "identified property" under the Act. t  If the property met
this requirement, the Governor-General's Proclamation could be made
only if the requirements of section 6(2) of the Act were also fulfilled. 67
' Statutory Rules 1983, No. 65 as amended.
"6 The Proclamation was made pursuant to § 6(3) of the World Heritage Properties
Conservation Act, AUsTRL. C. ACTS., No. 5 (1983). Schedule 2B of the Regulations
defined the Wet Tropics of Queensland as being two sections of land that fell within
the Cape Tribulation region of north Queensland. These areas were respectively 8,990
and 7.5 square kilometres in size, and included the Daintree Rainforest.
" § 3A(1)(a) of the Conservation Legislation Amendment Act, AUSTRL. C. ACTS.,
No. 196 (1988) provides that "identified property" is
any property in respect of which one or more of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) the property is subject to an inquiry established by a law of the Commonwealth
whose purpose, or one of whose purposes, is to consider whether the property forms
part of the cultural or natural heritage;
(ii) the property is subject to World Heritage List nomination;
(iii) the property is included in the World Heritage List provided for in paragraph 2 of
Article 11 of the Convention;
(iv) the property forms part of the cultural or natural heritage and is declared by the
regulations to form part of the cultural heritage or natural heritage....
"6 The relevant provisions of § 6(2) of the World Heritage Properties C onservation
Act, AUSTL. C. ACTS 1983 are as follows:
(b) the protection or conservation of the property by Australia is a matter of interna-
tional obligation, whether by reason of the Convention or otherwise;
(c) the protection or conservation of the proerty by Australia is necessary or desirable
for the purpose of giving effect to a treaty (including the Convention) or for the
purpose of obtaining for Australia any advantage or benefit under a treaty (including the
Convention);
(d) the protection or conservation of the property by Australia is a matter of interna-
tional concern (whether or not it is also a matter of domestic concern), whether by
reason that a failure by Australa to take proper measures for the protection or conser-
vation of the property would, or would be likely to, prejuedice Australia's relations with
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These conditions relate back to Australia's obligations to protect property
under the World Heritage Convention. By this mechanism, the necessary
connection is made in the legislation between the Commonwealth's power
over external affairs and the international obligations imposed by the
Convention.
In December 1988, Queensland commenced legal proceedings in the
High Court in which it sought a declaration that the Proclamation of
December 15, 1988, was invalid. Queensland questioned whether the
protected area was truly an area to which the World Heritage Properties
Conservation Act applied. The High Court dismissed the application,
holding that for the purposes of the Act the listing of the area by the
World Heritage Committee was conclusive evidence of Australia's interna-
tional obligation to protect the area under the World Heritage Convention.
The Court declared that the Commonwealth's nomination of the area for
inclusion on the World Heritage List, and the subsequent acceptance by
the World Heritage Committee, was not subject to judicial review.
Consequently, the Proclamation protecting the area was valid.
The six judges who wrote the joint judgment, Chief Justice Mason,
Justices Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh, reviewed in
some detail the provisions of the World Heritage Properties Conservation
Act and noted how it provided a legislative framework for the implemen-
tation of the World Heritage Convention.' In this case, at the time the
Proclamation was made, the property met the requirements of section
3A(1)(a)(iii) of the Act because it had been included on the World
Heritage List.69 The judges then turned their attention to subsections
(b), (c) and (d) of section 6(2) and noted that the protection or conserva-
tion of such an identified property fell within Australia's international
obligations under the World Heritage Convention. In response to
Queensland's argument that the inclusion of the property on the World
Heritage List was not conclusive of the Proclamation's validity, the judges
saw this as an issue of whether the protection or conservation of the
property gave rise to an international duty. 7 ' If an international duty
could be established, there was little doubt that the external affairs power
would support the legislation, especially in light of the decision in Tasma-
nian Dam. The Commonwealth's response to Queensland's challenge was
to argue that "the inscription of the property in the World Heritage List
by the Committee is sufficient and conclusive to establish that there is an
other countries or for any other reason.
"+s Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232, 235-36 (1989).
'69 Id. at 237.
170 Id. at 239.
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international duty to protect and conserve it ... .""' Citing Tasmanian
Forests"2 as authority for the Court's power to determine whether or
not a fact upon which a law is based exists, the judges set out to deter-
mine whether international law created an international duty to protect
this property.
After analyzing the relevant provisions of the Convention with
respect to the nomination of properties for the World Heritage List, the
judges were convinced that:
the status of a particular property as one of outstanding universal value
forming part of the cultural heritage or natural heritage is an objective
fact, ascertainable by reference to its qualities; but, as evaluation in-
volves matters of judgment and degree, an evaluation of the property
made by competent authorities under the Convention is the best evidence
of its status available to the international community."
While a State Party's nomination of property for World Heritage
Listing was some evidence of the property's status, the decision by the
World Heritage Committee was conclusive for international purposes, and
it followed that this was conclusive of Australia's international duty to
protect and conserve that property. 74 In the opinion of the judges, the
basis for the Proclamation could not be reviewed, and the Queensland
case therefore failed. It was acknowledged that, irrespective of what the
High Court decided as to the eligibility of the area for inclusion on the
World Heritage List, the international community had already decided the
matter conclusively. This created an international obligation for Australia
under the World Heritage Convention, which prevailed over the decision
of any municipal court. 75
The decision of the High Court in Daintree Rainforest further
171 Id.
1- 164 C.L.R. at 294 (1988).
"7 Queensland v. Commonwealth, 167 C.L.R. 232, 240 (1989).
174 Id.
" Justice Dawson wrote a separate but concurring judgment. After a thorough
review of the Convention, he noted that the initial obligation to identify properties as
forming part of the world's cultural or natural heritage fell on State Parties to the
Convention and not on the World Heritage Committee. However, the obligation to
protect identified property under arts. 4 and 5 was not dependent on the property being
included on the World Heritage List, as such identified property "does not cease to be
part of the cultural or natural heritage and the obligations imposed by the Convention
in relation to it remain in force." Id. at 245. Once the property had been included on
the World Heritage List, the provisions of § 3A become operative, and this justified
the making of the Proclamation to protect the property. Id. at 248.
1995]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
demonstrated the extent of the powers conferred on the Commonwealth
Parliament under the external affairs power. It also reaffirmed the ability
of the Commonwealth to rely on the World Heritage Convention to
protect areas which had been placed on the World Heritage List, despite
opposition from the state in which the property is located. The High
Court also gave a strong indication that it was not prepared to reconsider
whether a property possessed World Heritage characteristics once the
World Heritage Committee had ruled on a nomination.
C. Federal Implications of the World Heritage Cases
The most important impact of the World Heritage Cases on
Australia's federal system has been the adoption of an expansive view of
the Commonwealth's power to implement treaties to which Australia is a
party by enacting appropriate domestic legislation. In previous decisions
dealing with the external affairs power, the High Court had required the
treaty to be one that was truly international in character or reflected
substantial international concern.76 In Tasmanian Dam, however, the
majority judgments of Justices Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane
accepted that any international obligation imposed upon Australia by a
bona fide international tready could form the basis for legislation under
the external affairs power.77 In subsequent decisions, the need for the
treaty to impose an international obligation has been dispensed with. 8
Accordingly, the current position is that irrespective of whether or not a
treaty is representative of international concern or that it contains an
international obligation upon State Parties, the mere acceptance of the
treaty by Australia is a sufficient basis for the Commonwealth to rely on
the terms of the treaty to enact implementing legislation.'79
While the expanded interpretation of the treaty implementing aspect
of section 51(xxix) was the major outcome of the World Heritage Cases,
other aspects of the external affairs power were also considered, which
are important for understanding the influence of international law on
Australian domestic law. For example, in Tasmanian Dam some of the
76 See R. v. Burgess ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. 608 (1936); Koowarta v. Bjelke-
Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982).
n PETER HANKS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN AusTRALIA 344 (1991).
'17 This was the view of Justices Mason, Murphy and Deane in Tasmanian Dam,
158 C.L.R. 1, 125-26 (Mason, J.), 170-71 (Murphy, J.), 257-59 (Deane, J.) (1983). For
the views of other judges in the subsequent decisions, see Tasmanian Forests, 164
C.L.R. 261, 321 (Dawson, J.), 332-33 (Toohey, J.), 342-43 (Gaudron, J.) (1988);
Daintree Rainforest, 167 C.L.R. 232, 245-49 (Dawson, J.) (1989).
"7 Crawford, supra note 130, at 23; cf. R.D. Lumb, The External Affairs Power and
Constitutional Reform, 62 Ausm. L.J. 679, 681 (1988).
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judges adopted a view, previously pursued by Justice Stephen in
Koowarta, that a matter of "international concern" could be the subject of
legislation under the external affairs power. As such, international con-
cern, without the need for a treaty, could form the basis for a section
51(xxix) law."re The High Court has also suggested that the external
affairs power could be utilized by the Commonwealth to enact legislation
in discharge of an international obligation imposed by customary interna-
tional law.' In addition, the Court has noted in obiter dicta that the
external affairs power also extends to the enactment of legislation intend-
ed to give effect to recommendations made by international bodies.
Justice Murphy noted in Tasmanian Dam that the recommendations of the
U.N. and its agencies could be relied upon as the basis for a law dealing
with external affairs," while in the same case Justice Deane referred to
laws enacted in "compliance with recommendations of international agen-
cies. ' ' 3
Despite these decisions regarding the width of the treaty-implement-
ing aspect of section 51(xxix), the High Court has consistently held that
the Commonwealth does not acquire, merely by entering into a treaty
relationship with another State, plenary power over the general subject
matter of the treaty."8 One of the accepted limitations on the
Commonwealth's use of the external affairs power is that domestic
legislation based on an international treaty must be "appropriate and
adapted" to the purposes of the treaty in question."8 5 The application of
this test caused a five to two division within the Court in Tasmanian
Forests. The majority judges were of the opinion that the measures
adopted for the interim protection of the forests were in accordance with
Australia's international obligations under the World Heritage Conven-
tion. ' 6 However, Justices Deane and Gaudron wrote strong dissents on
" See Tasmanian Dam, 158 C.L.R. at 171 (Murphy, J.); Polyukhovich v. Common-
wealth, 172 C.L.R. 501, 561-62 (Brennan, J.), 657-58 (Toohey, J.) (1991); Rothwell,
supra note 54, at 228-30.
.8. In Tasmanian Dam, Justice Deane accepted that the discharge of "obligations
under both treaties and customary international law lie at the centre of a nation's
external affairs." 158 C.L.R. at 258 (1983). See also Polyukhovich v. Commonwealth,
172 C.L.R. 501, 560 (Brennan, J.), 657 (Toohey, J.) (1991).
.. 158 C.L.R. at 171-72, making reference to the World Health Organisation, the
Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Labor Organisation.
'1 Id. at 258-59.
I d. at 131 (Mason, J.), 172 (Murphy, J.).
' The accepted test is that laid down by Chief Justice Barwick in Airlines of
N.S.W. Pty. Ltd. v. New S. Wales (No. 2), 113 C.L.R. 54, 87 (1965); affd Tasmanian
Dam, 158 C.L.R. 1, 130 (Mason, J.), 259 (Deane, J.) (1983); Tasmanian Forest, 164
C.L.R. 261, 289 (Mason, C.J. & Brennan, J.), 303 (Wilson, J.) (1988).
'" Tasmanian Forest, 164 C.L.R. at 290-91 (Mason, C.J. & Brennan, J.), 303
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the basis of their belief that the Commonwealth legislation went beyond
what the Convention prescribed. Justice Deane argued that the test in
these cases should be whether there exists "a 'reasonable proportionality'
between that purpose or object and the means which the law adopts to
pursue it."'87 In this instance, his Honour was of the view that the
Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate such a relationship because the
protective measures implemented in reliance on the World Heritage
Convention prohibited a range of activities beyond the commercial
exploitation of the forests.' Justice Gaudron made a similar point, not-
ing that the Commonwealth law prohibited activities which posed no
threat to those qualities of the identified property that were integral to its
potential as a World Heritage area.'89 These strong dissents may be seen
as a warning to the Commonwealth that, even though the test for the
validity of legislation implementing a treaty is settled, the Court may
review the legislation to ensure that it represents an appropriate imple-
mentation of the treaty in question.'"
D. Current Practice Concerning World Heritage Sites
Following the political and legal debates of the 1980s over the
nomination and protection of World Heritage areas, a more cooperative
approach towards World Heritage management has emerged. The process
of nomination has been revised to ensure greater participation by state
governments in assessing the obligations that flow from World Heritage
listing. In 1986 the Commonwealth's nomination of Stage 2 of Kakadu
National Park in the Northern Territory was declared void because of a
flaw in the consultative process between the government and interested
parties over the consequences of nomination, especially in regard to the
interests of mining companies. 9 ' Though this decision was subsequently
(Wilson, J.), 327 (Dawson, J.), 336 (Toohey, J.) (1988).
" Id. at 311-12. Justice Gaudron adopted the view, that the Commonwealth law
must be "reasonably capable of being viewed as conducive to the purpose of the treaty
if it is also reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate, or adapted to, the
circumstance which engages the power." Id. at 342.
18 Id. at 317-18.
,9 Id. at 346-47.
190 In recent years, the relationship between Commonwealth legislation relating to
labour relations and the provisions of certain ILO Conventions has been questioned
from the perspective of whether the legislation appropriately implements the ILO
standards or whether it is at variance with such standards. See Breen Creighton,
Enforcement in the Federal Industrial Relations System: An Australian Paradox, 4
AUSTL. J. LAB. L. 197, 199-206 (1991); J.T. Ludeke, The External Affairs Power: An-
other Province for Law and Order?, 68 AUsTL. L.J. 250 (1994).
... Peko-Wallsend Ltd. v. Minister for Arts, Heritage and Env't, 70 A.L.R. 523
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reversed by a Full Court of the Federal Court,"2 the potential for a
World Heritage nomination to be contested in the courts because of a
flaw in the nomination processes within Australia caused a change in
government policy. 3 When the World Heritage values of the Tasma-
nian Forests were subsequently considered by the Commonwealth govern-
ment, a different approach was adopted. Instead of nominating the area
for the World Heritage List unilaterally, an independent Commission of
Inquiry was established to investigate whether the identified property was
suitable for nomination. The Commission, headed by a retired judge, Mr.
Justice Helsham, published a report," which generated further political
debate between the conservationists, the Commonwealth and the Tasma-
nian government, and ensured that the nomination process was canvassed
in public." However, the Commonwealth retreated from initiating an
inquiry in the case of the Queensland Wet Tropics nomination, and
unilaterally put forward the nomination against the wishes of the
Queensland government. It was this act which sparked the Queensland
challenge in the Daintree Rainforest case. The query raised in that de-
cision as to the bona fides of a federal executive decision to nominate or
protect an area under the World Heritage Convention, may have been the
catalyst for a further change in policy.
Since then, the Commonwealth has sought to cooperate with the
states in making World Heritage nominations. After prompting by the
Commonwealth government, Western Australia established a Ministerial
Committee to consider whether the state should proceed with the listing
of Shark Bay.'96 Following a positive response from the Committee to
possible listing, the Western Australian and Commonwealth governments
entered into detailed discussions concerning legislative and administrative
arrangements for Shark Bay in preparation for listing. An inter-govern-
mental agreement was signed in October 1990, in which the future
management of the area was detailed, and soon after the nomination
process commenced."l In the case of Fraser Island, located off the
(1986).
... Minister for Arts, Heritage and Env't v. Peko-Wallsend Ltd., 75 A.L.R. 218
(1987). See also Boer, supra note 131, at 270-72.
'93 See Ben Boer, Natural Resources and the National Estate, 6 ENVTL. & PLAN.
L.J. 134, 144 (1989).
'" REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE LEMONTHYME AND SOUTH-
ERN FORESTS, Vol 1 & 2 (1988).
193 See Tsamenyi et al., supra note 152.
,9 See Keith Suter, Shark Bay, Western Australia: A Case Study of UNESCO World
Heritage Listing, 11 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 31, 36 (1994).
'"7 Id. at 37.
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Queensland coastline, a similar cooperative approach was taken. This
process was facilitated by a change of government in Queensland, which
undertook a comprehensive study of the environmental and heritage
values of the area"'8 and assisted in the nomination process. This coop-
erative approach has continued with the recent nomination of "Australian
Fossil Sites," two of which are located in Queensland and one of which
is in South Australia.' The New South Wales government has also re-
cently enthusiastically endorsed the nomination of the Sydney Opera
House as a cultural heritage site."°
Another area of change in relation to World Heritage sites in Austra-
lia is that the Commonwealth has adopted a more cooperative approach
towards management of the listed areas. This has not resulted in the
Commonwealth abdicating responsibility for protecting the listed areas.01
Rather, a more cooperative approach has been taken instead of relying
solely on Commonwealth management under Commonwealth legisla-
tion. 2 A number of Commonwealth-state management plans have now
been adopted for the various World Heritage sites, and in some instances
state legislation controls certain activities within the areas.2 3
"' COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CONSERVATION, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF
FRASER ISLAND AND THE GREAT SANDY REGION, REPORT (1991)
"9 NOMINATION OF AUSTRALIAN FOSSIL SITES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
FOR INSCRIPTION ON THE WORLD HERITAGE LIST (Department of the Environment,
Sport and Territories, Australia, 1993); Julian Cribb, Fossil Sites Aim for Heritage
Listing, AUSTRALIAN, May 19, 1993, at 18.
However, not all nominations of World Heritage sites receive complete support
from state governments, see, e.g., Alec Marr, Green Light for World Heritage Assess-
ments, WILDERNESS NEWS, Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 15, discussing a campaign in Tasmania
for more areas to be nominated for World Heritage Listing despite the opposition of
the Tasmanian state government.
2' E.g., in 1992 the Commonwealth acted under the World Heritage Properties
Conservation Act 1983 to curtail the activities of a limestone quarry in Tasmania,
which was considered to be having a harmful impact on the Exit Cave system within
the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Property. See MONITORING REPORT ON
AUSTRALIA'S WORLD HERITAGE PROPERTIES JUNE 1992 - JUNE 1993 (Department of
the Environment, Sport and Territories, Australia, 1993) [hereinafter MONITORING
REPORT].
202 See Benjamin J. Richardson, A Study of Australian Practice Pursuant to the
World Heritage Convention, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 143, 151-53 (1990).
m See MONITORING REPORT, supra note 201.
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VI. CASE STUDY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ICCPR
A. Acceptance of the ICCPR and Optional Protocol
Australia has been a strong supporter of human rights throughout the
U.N. era. It is a party to the major U.N. human rights conventions, and
successive Australian governments have taken a strong stand on human
rights issues within the Asian Pacific region. 4 However, although Aus-
tralia has taken a strong international stand on human rights issues, its
domestic record is variable. This is partly a consequence of Australia's
federal structure, as there is no distinctive power conferred on the Com-
monwealth Parliament to deal with human rights matters. Nor does Aus-
tralia have an entrenched or enacted Bill of Rights.25 As a result, hu-
man rights issues in Australia have traditionally been matters within state
legislative jurisdiction. In recent times, however, Australia's acceptance of
various human rights treaties, together with the expansion of the external
affairs power following the World Heritage Cases, have enabled the
Commonwealth Parliament to take a more active role in implementing
international human rights standards in Australian law.2
Australia ratified the ICCPR2 °7 in 1980. At the time of ratification
Australia lodged a reservation, which took the form of an "advice" to the
effect that Australia was a federal State with powers divided between a
central and state governments, and that implementation of the ICCPR
would be a matter for the level of government responsible in the circum-
stances." s In 1984 the federal reservation was replaced by a "federal
' See Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Speech to
Amnesty International (Aug. 26, 1991), reprinted in 13 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 358
(1992).
2 See PETER BAILEY, HUMAN RIGHTS: AUSTRALIA IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
45, 105 (1990).
' The major High Court decision which preceded Tasmanian Dam, Koowarta v.
Bjelke-Petersen, 153 C.L.R. 168 (1982), dealt with the validity of the Racial Discrimi-
nation Act 1975, which was enacted to give effect to Australia's obligations under the
Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 46. For a review of human rights legis-
lation in Australia, see BAILEY, supra note 205, at 106-247; see generally NICK
O'NEILL & ROBIN HANDLEY, RETREAT FROM INJUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUsTRA-
LIAN LAW (1994) (providing an extensive analysis of human rights legislation in
Australia).
ICCPR, supra note 10.
See Gillian Triggs, Australia's Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Endorsement or Repudiation?, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 278, 304-
06 (1982). The Australian reservation is also reproduced at 1980 Austl. T.S. No. 23,
18; see also ICCPR, supra note 10.
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statement" having a similar effect.2' Australia's efforts to ensure that its
constitutional system would be appreciated by the U.N. and other parties
to the ICCPR was undoubtedly a reaction to the uncertainty then sur-
rounding the extent of the external affairs power, and may also have been
influenced by article 50 of the ICCPR, which indicated that federal States
had equal obligations to respect the rights guaranteed by the Cove-
nant.1 The lodgment of the initial reservation and later statement
indicated a particularly cautious approach on the part of the Common-
wealth government towards Australia's acceptance of the obligations under
the ICCPR.2 '
Notwithstanding Australia's adoption of the ICCPR in 1980, there
was protracted debate between the Commonwealth and state governments
over whether Australia should also accede to the First Optional Protocol
to the Covenant."' Eventually, it was announced on September 25,
See BURMESTER, supra note 80, at 537 n.54.
210 Art. 50 provides that "[t]he provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to
all parts of federal States without any limitations or exceptions." ICCPR, supra note
10, at 185.
"' One of the more extensive obligations imposed on State Parties is that found in
art. 2, which provides:
1 Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, within distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
2 Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accor-
dance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant,
to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognised in the present Covenant.
3 Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities,
or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.
Id. at 173-74. It is the view of some commentators that this Article imposes an
obligation upon the contracting parties to give effect to the terms of the Covenant in
their domestic law. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement the
Covenant in Domestic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RGHTS 311 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981).
22 Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 1991 Austl. T.S. No. 39. See Hilary
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1991, that Australia would accede,2"3 and the Optional Protocol entered
into force for Australia on December 25 that same year.2"' Acceptance
of the Optional Protocol was an important step in enhancing human rights
protection in Australia because it opened the possibility of individuals
communicating directly with the United Nations Human Rights Committee
with respect to alleged violations of the ICCPR."5 As Australia has yet
to legislate comprehensively at either Commonwealth or state level to
give effect to provisions of the ICCPR, the procedures available under the
Optional Protocol provide Australians with a valuable opportunity to have
their claims adjudged by an international body.
B. The Toonen Decision
The first communication that the Human Rights Committee received
from Australia was lodged on December 25, 1991, the day the Optional
Protocol entered into force for Australia." 6 The communication was
Charlesworth, Australia's Accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 18 MELB. U. L. REv. 426 (1991); Peter Kirby,
Federal - State Issues in Australia's Accession to the Optional Protocol, in
INTERNATIONALISING HUMAN RIGHTS: AUSTRALIA'S ACCESSION To THE FIRST OP-
TIONAL PROTOCOL 46 (Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, University of
Melbourne, 1992); Peter Thomson, Implications of Australian Ratification and Potential
Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, in PROCEEDINGS 1991 INTERNA-
TiONAL LAW WEEKEND 86, 89-91 (Centre for International and Public Law, Australian
National University, 1991).
213 News Release by Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade,
and Mr. Duffy, Attorney General (Sept. 25, 1991), reprinted in 13 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L
L. 361 (1992).
214 For discussion of the potential effect of the Protocol, see Christopher Caleo,
Implications of Australia's Accession to the First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 4 PuB. L. REv. 175 (1993); Charlesworth, su-
pra note 212.
21' The ICCPR itself provides far more restricted mechanisms for enforcement. Under
art. 40, State Parties are required to submit periodic reports to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights
recognized in the Covenant. ICCPR, supra note 10, at 181. Under art. 41, State
Parties may declare that they recognize the competence of the Human Rights Com-
mittee to consider communications from other State Parties, who have made a similar
declaration, in respect of breaches of the Covenant. Id. at 182. See also Charlesworth,
supra note 212, at 429.
216 See Wayne Morgan, Sexuality and Human Rights: The First Communication by
an Australian to the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 14 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 277
(1993).
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lodged by a Tasmanian resident, Mr. Nick Toonen. Toonen alleged that
his rights under the ICCPR had been infringed because, as a gay man, he
was subject to certain Tasmanian laws which criminalized all male
homosexual acts between consenting adults in private.217 It was alleged
that the relevant provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code infringed
Toonen's rights to privacy218 and equality1 9 under the ICCPR. As not-
ed by the Human Rights Committee when ruling on this matter:
Although in practice the Tasmanian police has not charged anyone either
with "unnatural sexual intercourse" or "intercourse against nature"
(section 122) nor with "indecent practice between male persons" (section
123) for several years, this author argues that because of his long-term
relationship with another man, his active lobbying of Tasmanian politi-
cians and the reports about his activities in the local media, and because
of his activities as a gay rights activist and gay HIV/AIDS worker, his
private life and his liberty are threatened by the continued existence of
Sections 122(a), (c) and 123 of the Criminal Code.'
One of the difficulties that Australia faced when this communication was
lodged was that the Commonwealth government had not established
adequate procedures to deal with such cases. This was an important factor
in this case because, although Australia is the party that is bound by the
217 The claims were specifically directed to §§ 122 and 123 of the Criminal Code
Act, No. 69 (Tas.) (1924). These sections provide as follows:
§ 122. Any person who (a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of
nature; (b) has carnal knowledge of an animal; or (c) consents to a male person having
carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature, is guilty of a crime.
§ 123. Any male person who, whether in public or private, commits any indecent
assault upon, or other act of gross indecency with, another male person, or procures
another male person to commit any act of gross indecency with himself or any other
male person, is guilty of a crime.
218 Art. 17 of the ICCPR provides:
1 No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2 Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
ICCPR, supra note 10, at 181.
219 Art. 26 of the ICCPR provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Id. at 179.
0 Human Rights Committee, Views, Communication No. 488/1992
(CCPRIC/50/D/488/1992: 4 April 1994) (hereinafter Toonen Decision), § 2.3.
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Covenant and required to respond to the Committee's enquiries concern-
ing the matter," it is Tasmania that was responsible for the enactment
and enforcement of the laws in question. Following the request from the
Committee in early 1992 for an Australian response to the communica-
tion, the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department requested a report
from Tasmania on the admissibility of the claim. Notwithstanding that the
Tasmanian government requested that admissibility of the claim be
contested, the Commonwealth government did not do so.' In addition,
when the case proceeded to the merits stage, the Commonwealth govern-
ment proffered the view that the Tasmanian law violated the right to
privacy (art. 17) and the right to freedom from discrimination on the
ground of sex (art. 26).'
The Human Rights Committee ruled on the communication on March
31, 1994, and forwarded its views to both the author of the communica-
tion and Australia. 4 It concluded that there had been a violation of
Article 17 of the Covenant. As such, the Committee's finding stated that
the author was entitled to a remedy, and that "[i]n the opinion of the
Committee, an effective remedy would be the repeal of Sections 122 (a),
(c) and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code."'
Consistently with a new procedure established by the Human Rights
Committee in 1990, States whose laws or actions are considered to be in
violation of the ICCPR are given a period of three months to respond to
the Committee's findings. In this instance, Australia was requested to give
information "on the measures taken to give effect to the views" of the
Committee.'
C. The Australian Response
In the days preceding the release of the Human Rights Committee's
ruling in the Toonen Decision, it became evident that a dispute could
,, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 1991 Austl. T.S. No. 39., at art. 4.
m Morgan, supra note 216, at 290.
Hilary Charlesworth, International Law Notes, Developments in the Toonen Case,
5 PUB. L. REv. 72 (1994).
' For a discussion of the decision by a member of the Human Rights Committee,
see Elizabeth Evatt, Report of the 50th Session of the Human Rights Committee 21
March - 8 April 1994, New York, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL MEETING
1994, 7, 7-8 (Australian & New Zealand Society of International Law, 1994).
"' Toonen Decision, supra note 220, § 10. As the Committee found a violation
under art. 17, it did not consider whether there had been a violation of art. 26, other
than to make an oblique reference in § 8.7 to its view that "sex" in art. 26 may be
taken to include sexual orientation.
- Id. § 12.
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develop between the Commonwealth and Tasmanian governments over the
matter, if the ruling were unfavourable to Australia. The Tasmanian
Attorney General indicated that the relevant Tasmanian legislation "will
be retained and the U.N. decision ignored," and that, if the Common-
wealth attempted to override the Tasmanian legislation by relying on the
external affairs power, Tasmania would consider a High Court chal-
lenge. 7 In response, the Commonwealth Attorney General indicated that
the "states were expected to conform with international standards" and
that "[i]f they failed to cooperate, the Commonwealth would be forced to
intervene.""22 In the weeks that followed, both the Tasmanian and
Commonwealth governments maintained their positions, though the
Commonwealth indicated that it was reluctant to intervene without first
giving Tasmania an opportunity to review its position and consider a
response to the Human Rights Committee ruling. 9 At the same time as
the debate between the state and federal governments was taking place,
concern was raised by some commentators about the impact of the Hu-
man Rights Committee ruling on Australia's sovereigntyY ° The Com-
monwealth Attorney General, Mr. Lavarch, responded by stating that the
Human Rights Committee was not interfering in Australian domestic legal
matters. He described its views in the Toonen Decision as no "stronger
than an advisory opinion" and argued that "[t]he action of sovereignty is
to decide whether to do anything or not. We are under absolutely no
obligation to do anything."'"
The Australian government response to the Toonen Decision was not
only a political issue between the Commonwealth and Tasmanian govern-
ments; political leaders of other parties in federal Parliament also entered
m Tasmania May Ignore UN on Gay Rights, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 7,
1994, at 3.
2' Amanda Meade & Andrew Darby, Gov't Will Enforce Ruling on Tas Gay Law:
Lavarch, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 8, 1994, at 3.
9 Amanda Meade & Andrew Darby, UN Gays Ruling Puts Pressure on Tasmania,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 12, 1994, at 3; Andrew Darby, Tasmania Defiant on
Gay Exclusion, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 13, 1994, at 7.
230 Padraic P. McGuinness, Kangaroo Court Takes Liberties with our Rights,
AUSTRALIAN, Apr. 20, 1994, at 11; Padraic P. McGuinness, Parliament Left Behind in
Embrace of International Treaties, AUSTRALIAN, May 18, 1994, at 13.
"' Amanda Meade, Lavarch Denies Gay Law Danger, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Apr. 18, 1994, at 6. A State Party to the Optional Protocol is not required to take any
specific measures under the Protocol in response to an adverse finding by the Human
Rights Committee. However, State Parties remain under an obligation, in accordance
with art. 2 of the ICCPR, to take such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant; see ICCPR, supra
note 10, and ICCPR art. 2, supra note 211.
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the debate. The parliamentary leaders of both official Opposition parties
stated that they would oppose any attempt by the Commonwealth govern-
ment to override the Tasmanian law. 2 It was argued that, in the light
of this case, Australia's treaty-making processes should be reformed to
ensure that international bodies did not have as much power over Austra-
lian domestic law. 3 After further discussions between the Tasmanian
and Commonwealth governments, at which Tasmania confirmed that it did
not intend to repeal or amend the offending provisions of its Criminal
Code, the Commonwealth government announced that it would prepare
legislation to override the Tasmanian law. This intention has now been
communicated to the Human Rights Committee and the Commonwealth
government has recently enacted legislation to deal with the matter.'
The Commonwealth has a number of options available to it in
overriding the Tasmanian legislation.?5 In each case the constitutional
basis for the federal legislation will be the external affairs power, by
which the Commonwealth will seek to implement some of the terms of
the ICCPR into Australian law." Following the High Court's decisions
in the World Heritage Cases, the Commonwealth can be confident that it
has a solid basis upon which to enact appropriate and adapted legislation
3 Amanda Meade, Hewson Won't Fight Tas Gay Ban, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Apr. 20, 1994, at 3. At the time of the Committee's ruling the Leader of the Opposi-
tion was Dr. John Hewson, who was replaced soon thereafter by Mr. Alexander
Downer.
" Alexander Downer, Speech to the National Press Club (June 8, 1994) (transcript
on file with authors). Mr. Downer stated:
We believe that the protection of Australia's national interests are most effectively
upheld by Australians through our Parliaments, our courts and other bodies, and not
through U.N. or other international committees that are ill-suited to playing any direct
role in the Australian legal system and many of which are themselves widely recognised
as being in need of reform. We believe that Australia's international treaty-making pro-
cesses need to be reformed to ensure that the Australian Parliament, the States, industry
and the community are given a proper say in international law-making by Australian
Governments.
Letter from Duncan Kerr, Acting Attorney General, to Dr. Nisuke Ando, Chair-
person, Human Rights Committee (July 8, 1994) (on file with authors); Michael
Lavarch, Attorney General, News Release - Bill to Protect Privacy in the Bedroom
(Aug. 22, 1994) (on file with authors); Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994.
' In § 109 the Australian Constitution provides that "[w]hen a law of a [s]tate is
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid." The effect of an appropriately
drafted Commonwealth law in this case would thus be to override inconsistent provi-
sions of Tasmania's Criminal Code. AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 109.
' For a review of previous efforts by the Commonwealth government to implement
the terms of the ICCPR, see Caleo, supra note 214, at 181.
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and that any constitutional challenge by Tasmania would fail.' It
would seem, therefore, that Commonwealth legislation enacted to override
the Tasmanian law would not be controversial on constitutional grounds.
However, the Toonen Decision demonstrates once again the potential
for the external affairs power to be relied on to legislate on topics that
have traditionally fallen within the competence of the Australian states,
and that the Commonwealth has hitherto been content to relegate to the
states. The case also demonstrates for the first time the potential impact
of rulings of the Human Rights Committee on Australian law. While the
Committee's decisions are not binding on State Parties, and despite the
circumstance that there is no adequate mechanism under the Optional
Protocol for enforcement of its rulings, the importance of such decisions
should not be underestimated. States that freely submit to the authority of
the Committee under the Optional Protocol are likely to be subject to
strong criticism if they ignore a ruling against them. This may especially
be so in the case of Australia, which prides itself on its comparatively
good human rights record and takes an active role in reviewing the
human rights compliance of other States in the region."8 The Toonen
Decision demonstrates that Australia will respond to rulings of the Human
Rights Committee. Moreover, although the rights of states to determine
their own affairs will generally be respected, if they fail to ensure that
their laws conform with Australia's international obligations under the
ICCPR, the Commonwealth is prepared to override state laws through use
of the external affairs power. As there are other Australian communica-
tions currently before the Human Rights Committee, it is possible that the
Commonwealth government may be called on to respond in similar ways
in the future.29
" Two potential constitutional difficulties which could arise in respect of the
Commonwealth legislation are (1) whether the legislation is "appropriate and adapted"
to the terms of the ICCPR, particularly art. 17; and (2) whether the legislation dis-
criminates against Tasmania, or singles it out from the other states, and thereby
infringes an implied constitutional limitation on federal legislative power; see, e.g.,
Melbourne Corp. v. Commonwealth 74 C.L.R. 31 (1947); Queensland Elec. Comm'n v.
Commonwealth, 159 C.L.R. 192 (1985).
23 Caleo, supra note 214, at 187, takes the view that "[iun Australia, a country with
- relatively speaking - an impressive record of democratic freedom, where freedoms are
well enjoyed if not so well protected, the pressure which would be brought to bear on
government to ensure compliance with any Committee view is likely to be heavy."
" For a history of three recent communications, see Hilary Charlesworth, Inter-
national Law Notes, Admissibility Decisions of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, 4 PuB. L. RaV. 265, 266 (1993); Hilary Charlesworth, International Law
Notes, New Communication Filed Against Australia Under the First Optional Protocol,
5 PuB. L. REV. 71 (1994).
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VII. CONCLUSION
This article has canvassed a range of issues that confront Australia
in dealing with international law on the domestic front. Many of these
difficulties result from a federal Constitution that fails to define clearly
the role of the federal executive or the constitutional power of the federal
Parliament in respect of the country's foreign affairs. When these factors
are combined with the political nature of the federal compact in Australia,
recent federal governments have sought to involve the states in the
process of implementing international treaties in Australia. This coopera-
tive approach to federalism has not always been successful, and certain
legal and political issues concerning the impact of international law in
Australia remain unsettled. As Australia's involvement in world affairs
grows, and as international law exerts its growing influence on States
within the international community, the issues confronting Australia are
likely to assume greater prominence. In the context of this Article, a
number of conclusions can be drawn from the issues which have been
raised.
A. The External Affairs Power and Australian Federalism
At the time Australia became a federation in 1901, the powers
conferred on the Commonwealth Parliament were considered adequate to
meet the expected functions of central government. However, viewed in
the late 20th Century, the failure to include amongst the subject matter of
Commonwealth power such areas as environmental protection and man-
agement, human rights and civil liberties, seems incongruous. An impor-
tant consequence of the decisions in the World Heritage Cases is that an
expansive interpretation of the legislative power over external affairs
enables the Commonwealth to implement into Australian law the terms of
a wide range of treaties. These treaties may deal not only with environ-
mental protection, human rights and civil liberties, but also with topics
that were never envisaged at the time of federation as being the subject
of international law. Providing such laws meet the tests laid down by the
High Court in the World Heritage Cases, the Commonwealth has the
ability to expand the ambit of its legislation by entering into and imple-
menting a growing list of treaties dealing with an ever expanding subject
matter.
This development has raised concern over the federal balance of
powers between the Commonwealth and the states. It is feared that, if the
Commonwealth continues to enter into treaties and rely on them as the
constitutional basis for its legislation, the role of the states will diminish
to such an extent that Australia will cease to be a federation in which
legislative power is shared between central and regional governments. The
19951
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High Court, however, has not been prepared to limit the potential scope
of Commonwealth power in this area. In Tasmanian Dam, Justice Murphy
noted that, while in that case and at that time reliance on the external
affairs power may have been considered exceptional, "[i]ncreasingly, use
of the external affairs power will not be exceptional or extraordinary but
a regular way in which Australia will harmonize its internal order with
the world order."2" It it not surprising that, since this comment was
made, the Commonwealth has continued to rely on the external affairs
power to legislate on subject matters that were previously considered to
be within the competence of the states.24
The World Heritage Cases not only confer upon the federal Parlia-
ment power to legislate with respect to treaties, but also suggest that
matters the subject of customary international law, international recom-
mendations, or even international concern, can form the basis of an
"external affair" for the purpose of section 51(xxix) of the Constitution.
This opens up to the Commonwealth Parliament an even wider field of
subjects upon which it might choose to legislate.242
B. Cooperative Federalism and International Law
One response during the past ten years to the expanded scope of the
Commonwealth Parliament's power over external affairs has been to adopt
a more cooperative approach to federalism in Australia. Through this
process, the states have had a greater policy input into decisions concern-
ing Australia's treaty relations, and an expanded role in the domestic
-o 158 C.L.R. 1, 170 (1983).
241 E.g., between 1975 and 1992 there were 15 occasions on which the Common-
wealth enacted environmental legislation in reliance on international treaties. See
Crawford, supra note 130, at 21; Gerry Bates, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA
56-57 (3d ed. 1992).
242 The Commonwealth has recently taken this action with amendments to the In-
dustrial Relations Act, Ausm. C. AcTs No. 86 (1988), introduced by the Industrial
Relations Reform Act, No. 98 (1993). The now revised Industrial Relations Act, §
170BA gives effect to two recommendations adopted by the General Conference of the
International Labour Organisation (ILO), copies of which are appended to the Act as
part of the Schedule. These ILO Recommendations, in conjunction with certain ILO
Conventions are relied upon as a basis for Commonwealth power over certain areas of
industrial relations which are not covered in § 51(xxxv), Constitution which confers
upon the Commonwealth certain powers in regard to "industrial disputes". These issues
may soon be ventilated before the High Court in a challenge by several states to the
constitutional validity to the Industrial Relations Reform Act, No. 98 (1993). See WJ.
Ford, The Constitution and the Reform of Australian Industrial Relations, 7 AUSTL. J.
LAB. L. 105 (1994).
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implementation and enforcement of the obligations imposed by those
treaties. This approach has generally been a successful one provided there
has been a clear division of responsibility between Commonwealth and
states over the relevant subject matter and the Commonwealth has been
able to gain the cooperation of the states in creating a cooperative
legislative scheme.243
However, this cooperative federal approach has not always been a
success for a number of reasons. First, cooperative legislation has caused
delays in assuming or fulfilling international treaty obligations. In the case
of Australia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the lack
of agreement among the states was the principal reason for the eleven
year delay between Australia's ratification of the Covenant and its
eventual acceptance of the Protocol.' 4 Secondly, reliance on state legis-
lation has often resulted in lack of uniformity in Australian laws imple-
menting international treaties. For example, state anti-discrimination laws,
which partially implement several international human rights instruments,
differ widely in their scope, complaint procedures and remedies. Thirdly,
the coordination of state and federal legislation has thrown up substantial
legal problems, which the Commonwealth Solicitor-General has described
as the "steps of a dance in the mine-field of constitutional law." '245
Amongst these difficulties are the issues of whether the external affairs
power permits the Commonwealth to implement a treaty only partially
and, if so, whether such legislation can validly leave room for the
operation of state laws that conflict with the treaty obligations. Finally,
there is a danger that a state may put Australia in breach of its interna-
tional obligations by legislating inconsistently with the relevant treaty.
Given established principles of State responsibility,2' it is the Common-
23 An example would be the cooperative arrangements entered into concerning sea
dumping in the Australian offshore; see, e.g., Environment Protection (Sea Dumping)
Act, Ausm. C. ACT, No. 101, § 9 (1981), Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act,
No. 60 (Tas.) (1987).
244 See Gough Whitlam, Australia and the UN Commission on Human Rights, 45
AusTL. J. INT'L AFF. 51 (1991); Alan Rose, Commonwealth State Aspects: Implementa-
tion of the First Optional Protocol, in INTERNATIONALISING HUMAN RIGHTS:
AUSTRALiA'S ACCESSION TO THE FIRST OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 35, 42-43 (Centre for
Comparative Constitutional Studies, University of Melbourne, 1992); 159 PARL. DEB.,
H. R., 369 (Feb. 18, 1988).
"s Gavan Griffith, Dancing Through the Minefield: Can Co-operative Federalism
Work?, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AUSTRALIAN DEBATE 98, 99 (Lynne Spender ed.,
1987). See also McCarry, supra note 78.
24 Under international law, a State may not invoke the provisions of its internal law
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Moreover, the actions of the
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wealth that is held accountable to the international community for any
such breach, as is evident in the Commonwealth's response to the ruling
of the Human Rights Committee in the Toonen Decision. Although this
problem may be righted by terminating the treaty or by enacting overrid-
ing federal legislation, the potential need for executive or legislative
action of this kind demonstrates the difficulties of cooperative federalism
in implementing Australia's international treaty obligations.
C. Balancing Federal Interests and Foreign Policy Obligations
As has been apparent from the foregoing discussion, the conduct and
review of Australia's foreign affairs involves a complex matrix of interac-
tion between all branches of government at both the state and federal
levels. Within this matrix the federal executive has the pre-eminent role.
The state executives have only a consultative role in relation to the
conclusion of treaties whose subject matter falls within an area of tradi-
tional state responsibility. The legislature has a more circumscribed role
in Australia's foreign affairs process because no formal legislative approv-
al is required before Australia expresses its consent to be bound by a
treaty. The principal function of the legislature is to ensure that Australian
law conforms with the obligations imposed on Australia by treaties to
which the federal executive has expressed or intends to express
Australia's consent to be bound. While implementing legislation is most
frequently enacted by the federal Parliament, state Parliaments are some-
times called on to enact laws to implement treaties falling within areas of
their traditional legislative responsibility, pursuant to principles of cooper-
ative federalism. This requires a delicate balance to be struck between the
need to ensure that Australia is not placed in breach of its treaty ob-
ligations as a result of aberrant state laws, and the need to preserve an
acceptable division of power between the federal and state legislatures.
In addition to the role of the executive and legislature, the judiciary
also plays an important part. In accordance with their common law
heritage, Australian courts show considerable deference to decisions made
by the executive in the conduct of the country's foreign relations. Such
self-imposed limitations are evident in the courts' refusal to adjudicate
upon foreign affairs questions that are regarded as political, to grant
standing to individuals seeking to impugn foreign affairs decisions, and to
inquire into certain facts certified by the executive as true. Notwith-
legislature of an Australian state are attributable to Australia itself; INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY, pt. I, art. 6, reprinted
in IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY (PART I),
284 (1983).
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standing this attitude of deference, the High Court has maintained its
position as the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution. In this
capacity, the Court has recently played a significant role in interpreting
the extent of the Commonwealth Parliament's constitutional powers to
make laws with respect to matters dealt with in treaties to which Austra-
lia has become a party.
It is clear that a continuing difficulty in the conduct of Australia's
foreign affairs is the need to balance the national interest in pursuing a
robust foreign policy with the political exigencies of a federal system of
government. Although the federal government faces few formal .impedi-
ments to the formulation and implementation of its desired foreign policy,
the political need to involve the states in the foreign policy process when
the subject matter of the policy involves state interests is potentially
problematic. The recent events surrounding the Toonen Decision are a
telling reminder that Sir Kenneth Wheare's observation that "[flederalism
and a spirited foreign policy go ill together"247 contains more than a
modicum of truth in the Australian federation.
247 WHEARE, supra note 1.

